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Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of
Ethnic Minorities
Adeno Addis
The idea that I think we need today in order to make decisions in political matters cannot be the idea of a totality, or of
the unity, of a body. It can only be the idea of a multiplicity
or diversity ...

in which justice is not placed under a rule of

convergence but rather a rule of divergence. I believe that this
is the theme that one finds constantly in present day writing
under the name ."minority".
-Jean-Francois Lyotard'
I.

PROLOGUE

The 1990s have begun with seemingly contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, one sees the resurgence and intensification of nationalistic and ethnic consciousness around the world,
calling for the breaking up of empires, republics, and autocracies.
The events in the Soviet Union,2 Canada,- Ethiopia,4 Sri Lanka,5

* Associate Professor of Law, Tulane University; Visiting Associate Professor of Law,
Duke University (Fall 1991).
1 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1984), cited
in IRIS M. YOUNG, JUsTIcE AND THE POLMTICS OF DIFFERENCE 156 (1990).
2 As I am writing this Article, the Soviet Union seems to be disintegrating. The Baltic states-Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia-have declared their independence and the
Soviet Union, or what remains of it, has recognized the declarations. Of the remaining
republics, seven have declared their independence from the center. And the indication is
that more will follow that course. Those that have declared their independence are
AzerbaUan, Byelorussia, Georgia, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, and the Ukraine. Even
though there is now an interim Union government, a very weak Union government, to
which the twelve republics have agreed, there is no guarantee that the Union will continue to hold. Indeed, indications are that, for all practical purposes, the republics will continue to act as independent states. The collapse has the real prospect of leading to serious inter-ethnic conflicts, because significant minorities reside in most of the republics. In
the Ukraine, for example, 22% of the entire population is Russian. In Kazakhstan it is
38%. And Kirghiz has a Russian minority that consitues 21% of the entire population.
In all the republics, except perhaps Armenia (where 93% of the population is Armenian), there are significant minorities. In addition, it is likely to lead to inter-republic disputes, because some of the republics, especially the Russian Republic, are raising the
issue of redrawing borders if there is a break up of the Soviet state. 15 U.S.S.R.: Facts
and Figures 499 (Alan P. Pollard ed., 1991).
3 In Canada, the Quebec question never seems to be resolved and has recently
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and Eastern Europe6 are clear examples of that tendency. In each
of those countries there are movements, primarily ethnic-based,
that are asserting what they see to be a right of self-determination,
a right which is usually taken to mean the declaration of the independence of the territorial unit within which the ethnic group
resides.
On the other hand, one also sees a tendency for political and
economic union to form larger units. What is occurring in Western Europe, despite the reluctance of some political leaders7 in the
United Kingdom, is a prime example of this phenomenon.

received a more intense play in the media. In a recent New York Times article, Clyde
Farnsworth writes: "The newly recognized independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

has been seized upon by Quebec nationalists as a point of encouragement for their own
dreams of an independent Quebec. The firing up of the separatist threatens to add a
new complication to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's efforts to keep Canada united." Mr.
Jacques Parizeau, the Quebec separatist leader who was a former finance minister and a
professor of economics, is quoted as saying that if independence works for the three
Baltic states, which have a total population of eight million as compared to seven million
in Quebec, "I have the impression it will be no less difficult in Quebec." Clyde H.
Farnsworth, Quebec Separatist Hails Baltics' Independence N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 8, 1991, at 14, col.
1.

4 Ethiopia is barely together now. Ethiopia, however, is not the only African
country with inter-ethnic tension and conflict. Somalia is just about to disintegrate. Indeed, ethnic conflict is a phenomenon in many developing countries. In Asia there have
been intense inter-ethnic conflicts. India and China have, for example, had serious ethnic
conflicts and tension.
5 See M. L. Marasinghe, Ethnic Politics and Constitutional Reforn: The Indo-Si Lankan
Accord, 37 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 551 (1988). Since about 1983 Sri Lanka has been afflicted
with intense and destructive ethnic conflict between the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamil. In the last few years, the demand of the Tamils has moved from that of
the establishment of an ethnically ascertained sub-state in the northern and eastern part
of the island, where most Tamils live, to one of constituting the area as a separate sovereign state.
6 In Central Europe, there are similar tendencies. In Yugoslavia, for example, the
Croats and the Slovenes have been attempting to secede from the federation which they
believe is dominated by the Serbs. The attempt to secede has led to serious conflict and
considerable destruction and there does not seem to be a solution in sight. And in
Czechoslovakia, the Czechs and the Slovaks do not seem to get along well. See Celestine
Bohlen, Evolution in Europe: Ethnic Rivalries Revive in East Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1990, at Al, col. 3. It is reported that "in 1923, 30 million out of 110 million people
living in the region were considered minorities in their countries. Now, after the mass
killings and migrations of World War II, the number of people counted as belonging to
ethnic minorities has dropped to about 14 million, but it is still more than 10 percent of
the population." Id.
7 To a lesser extent, there are similar movements in many parts of the world. Even
though it does not have as much currency now as it did in the 1960s and 1970s, the
rhetoric of African unity is still heard in the corridors of many conferences in that part
of the world. In Asia, the Association of South East Asian Nations (A.S.E.A.N.) is perhaps
a clear example of the desire of nations to join forces as a result of economic and other
necessities.
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What one observes is, therefore, a resurgence of ethnic consciousness and separatism along with developments that seem to
recognize the economic and technological imperatives of the late
twentieth century: the interdependent nature of the lives of nations and communities.
Which tendency will dominate the international political life
of the decade is hard to predict. Indeed, a prediction may not be
possible, much less advisable, given the nature of international
politics in the last year or two. One thing is certain: neither tendency is likely to disappear from the political landscape, and ethnic consciousness and conflict are likely to intensify.
When one observes inter-ethnic conflict raging from South
Asia to Africa, and from North America to Southern Europe, one
is tempted to think that this decade might be defined partially by
inter-ethnic conflicts. The topic of this symposium is, therefore,
one that is likely to be central to the intellectual and political
concerns of this decade, especially given what the demise of totalitarianism seems to have ushered into
the Soviet Union and East8
ern Europe: the old ethnic rivalries.
This political tendency to destabilize the center, and, hence,
the currently accepted form of union, has an intellectual analogue
in current theorization within the humanities and the social sciences. An intellectual orientation loosely referred to as
postmodernism 9 has, in the last few years, been challenging what

8 The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe used to make the claim that in their socialist order, ethnic differences had been transcended and hence had been rendered politically irrelevant. Unfortunately, as recent events clearly demonstrated, it was politics
itself, not ethnic differences, that was made irrelevant in those societies. The leaders of
those societies mistook the silence resulting from political disengagement for a
transformative harmony.
9 ' For a leading theorist of postmodernism, see JEAN-FRANcOIs LyoTARD, supra note
1. Lyotard describes postmodernism as a rejection of grand narratives and totalizing
thoughts and the accentuating of diversity, locality, specificity, and contingency. Because
of technological and informational transformations, Lyotard believes that we have entered
an era where knowledge is constantly changing, where our concepts of ourselves and of
others are unstable, and where a teleological view of history can no longer anchor the
meaning of our existence and our relationship with the social and physical world.. Indeed, for Lyotard, the master narrative of the Enlightenment, the narrative of mastery
and liberation, has been nothing less than a discourse of terror and forced consensus.
There are others, however, who have a different reading of the postmodern. Perhaps the
most prominent is Frederic Jameson. Jameson, uneasy about what he senses to be a nihilistic tendency in the above reading of postmodernism, gives a different account. For
Jameson, postmodernismn is the "cultural logic" of the latest stage of capitalism. Seeing it
this way allows Jameson to hold onto his grand narrative, Marxism. While Lyotard wants
to resist all those claims that hold themselves out as complete stories of the human con-
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it believes to be the dominant mode of understanding, i.e., modernism or the Enlightenment: the idea of a "universal" (foundational) narrative against which all stories may be judged for their
validity, and the notion that liberation and progress can be understood in the image of a spiral where there is continual convergence among groups and where differences are ultimately transcended.
While the political movement is about decentering the idea of
territorial unity, or at least weakening the territorial center, the
intellectual movement is intent on decentering the notion of the
master narrative that supposedly defines that unity or center and
determines the hierarchy within it. The two are tied by two common themes. Both see the notion of unity and convergence to be
tyrannical and exclusionary, and both celebrate the politics of
difference."0 In both its political and intellectual dimensions, decentering has attracted members of minority groups, people who
are traditionally considered at the margins of societies. This is
because decentering offers the possibility that the voice of the
Other (of minorities) will not remain consigned to the margins of
social and political existence and that the center which has consigned them to the periphery will not be the reference point.
Both the political and intellectual movements are, therefore,
struggling to find conceptual and institutional ways by which those
who are defined to be different by the dominant culture, and
consequently marked out to be marginal in the social and political
life of the polity, will be able to actively participate in the formation and reformation of the social and political space they inhabit.
The issue of the rights of ethnic minorities is one that attempts to
deal with those conceptual and institutional questions.
II.

INTRODUCTION

This Article is about the concept of ethnic rights, a concept
which is currently widely invoked in political and 'legal discourse in

dition, and while he sees them as coercive and terroristic, Jameson claims that
posunodernism simply requires us to employ Marxism, the totalizing theory of history and
society, in a social and technological environment with new social formations and social
space. FREDERIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM: OR THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF CAPITALISM
(1991).
10 By the phrase "the politics of difference," I mean a form of politics that views
group differences in a positive light and attends to, rather than represses, those differences. It is the rejection of teleological self-confidence, and the notions of impartial competence and the omniscient center. See generally, IRIS M. YOUNG, supra note 1.
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both the national and international domains. The clarity of the
concept has, unfortunately, not matched its popularity. Indeed,
some might say that its popularity is inversely related to its clarity
and even its usefulness. The purpose of this Article is to inquire
into the various meanings that are ascribed to the phrase in order
to see which one is descriptively plausible, normatively defensible,
and institutionally enforceable. The claim of this Article is that the
phrase as traditionally understood-as a short hand for individual
rights-is either superfluous or incapable of being given institutional meaning.
This Article further argues that the only plausible way to understand the notion of ethnic rights is to conceive of it as being a
right of a group. Cultural rights are the best example of such a
right.
The notion of a cultural right becomes necessary because of
the existence of cultural domination." The dominant cultural
understanding and experience of a society tends to universalize
itself as the inevitable norm for social life, marking the culture of
the marginal as the "Other," either to be excluded or "normalized." To say that cultural rights become necessary because of the
existence of cultural domination is to make the point that both
culture and rights are not essentialist, but relational concepts.
They are, as I shall argue later, processes through which identities
and political paradoxes are negotiated.
The political responses of dominant groups (regimes) to ethnic minorities have usually taken one of three forms. I shall refer
to these responses as total negation, assimilation, and pluralism.
Under the first response, regimes see minorities as a negation of
the majority, culturally or otherwise. There are only two things
one can do to that which is seen to be a total negation of oneself.
One can either totally annihilate it-the most prominent example
is Hitler's attempt to exterminate the Jews-or move it away from
one's physical environment. The expulsion of a group from the
political unit is an example of the latter.
The 'second response, assimilation, is currently perhaps the
most common response to ethnic differences. Here, the object is
to transform minority groups into some version of the majority.
To assimilate means to mold, to the extent possible, the minority

11 "Concern for humanization leads at once to the recognition of dehumanization,
not only as an ontological possibility but as an historical reality." PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 27 (1970).

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:615

in the image of the dominant group, by requiring the minority to
learn the language of the majority, to follow the cultural practices
of the majority, and generally to adjust its social practices and rituals to conform to those of the majority.
Neither of the above two responses takes the notion of cultural rights for minorities seriously. The first sees minorities as a negation of the majority and hence not deserving any right. The
second sees minorities and their cultures as poor imitations or
extensions of the majority and its culture. Assimilation is imperialism with a seemingly kinder face. It is imperialist for a number of
reasons. The standards according to which the minorities are "normalized," though considered to be neutral and universal, are, in
fact, culturally and experientially specific standards of the dominant group. Moreover, the process of assimilation allows the dominant group to simultaneously universalize itself and particularize
the Other. And any resistance to the process by the Other is often
12
defined as abnormal.
The third response, which I have referred to as pluralism,
holds that differences are to be celebrated rather than feared. In
this response, development and democracy are not seen to be
incompatible with the acknowledgement and celebration of differences. Actually, there are two kinds of pluralism. The first could
be referred to as paternalistic (or complacent) pluralism. The
second might be called critical pluralism. In both of its dimensions, pluralism attempts to provide certain rights for its minorities. There is, however, a difference between the two in why and
how those rights are conferred.
Paternalistic pluralism "protects" the culture of minorities as
the Other. Here, the toleration of the culture of ethnic minorities
is motivated by a desire to save a particular group and its cultural
practices from the majority's own actions which threaten to annihilate the minority. Under this model, the minority group cannot
engage, and is not regarded as capable of engaging, the majority
in a creative and constant dialogue. And the structure and resources that will enable such a dialogue are denied this group.
What governments have done to indigenous peoples in Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States is a good example of
this. Indigenous peoples in these countries are treated in the same
way one would treat a "vanishing species of nonhuman fauna ....
1,,s They are to be preserved as Another, rather than to
12
13

See IRIS M. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 163-68.
Pierre L. van den Berghe, Protection of Ethnic Minorities: A Critical Appraisal, in PRO-
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be engaged as partners in the creation and recreation of the social world that both inhabit. Pluralism of the paternalistic kind is
as dehumanizing as negation itself, for it is based on the assumption that the minority has little to impart to the majority and
cannot therefore be regarded as a partner in dialogue.
What I have elected to refer to as "critical pluralism" does
more than "protect" the minority. In fact, it is not even comfortable with the notion of protection., Rather, it is committed to
doing two things. First, it actively intervenes to provide the resources that will enable the minority culture to flourish. But that
alone is not sufficient. It is also committed to developing institutional structures that will enable the majority to open itself up to
the minority, to accept the minority as a dialogue partner. Put
simply, critical pluralism will adhere simultaneously to the politics
of difference and dialogue. Indeed, the politics of difference is an
essential condition for dialogue. When the dominant group engages the oppressed in a dialogue it is acknowledging two things.
First, it assumes that the dialogue partner cannot be understood
either as an imitation of or deviation from the dominant culture.
One does not engage a deviant in a dialogue. Rather, one seeks
to heal the deviant, either medically or with divine guidance. Healing, by its very nature, is one-directional. Second, the, dominant
group sees its experience and culture not as universal and neutral,
but as specific 14and located in the same way it sees the marginal
cultures to be.

I shall argue in this Article that critical pluralism provides the
best model for understanding the notion of minority cultural
rights, and that an ideal of politics in a heterogeneous public
must be the affirmation of group differences while simultaneously
linking those groups in a process of institutional dialogue. Critical
pluralism acknowledges the pervasiveness and importance of social
groups in our lives 15 and the exclusionary consequences when
TECION OF MINORMES: COMPARATIVE PERsPECTIVES 343 (Roger G. Wirising ed. 1981).

14 Antonio Faundez, in a dialogue with Paulo Freire, correctly observed: "We learn
only if we accept that others are different-otherwise, for example, dialogue is impossible. Dialogue can only take place when we. accept that others are different and can
teach us something we do not already know." PAULO FREIRE & ANTONIO FAUNDEz, LEARNING TO QUESTION: A PEDAGOGY OF LIBERATION, 26 (1989).
15 "We are born into certain groups, others we choose, and still others choose us.
Life not subject to the call of groupness is as difficult for us to imagine as life not subject to the individuating call of personhood or to the sociating call of sociality." Ronald
R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1070
(1983).
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one denies their existence. Still, it is also conscious of the contingent nature of these groups, whose very meaning and structure
could be transformed in the process of genuine institutional dialogue.1 6 Group identities are contingent in the sense that differences (identities) are established relationally. This means that what
sorts of relationships establish differences, and who gets to define
those relationships, matters. A different form of relationship, and
hence a different process of naming differences, will give rise to a
different form of identity, emphasizing one (or one group) rather
than another (or another group) of the multiple factors that can
7
potentially constitute an identity.'
III.

WHAT DOES ETHNIC RIGHT MEAN?

Just over a decade ago, Michael Walzer, who has invested a
great deal of his energy and his considerable intellect over the
years to understanding the nature and institutional implications of
pluralism, 8 observed: 'The practical meaning of ethnic pluralism ...
is still being hammered out, in the various arenas of
political and social life. Little theoretical justification exists for any
particular outcome."" One could substitute the word "rights" for
"pluralism" and one would be justified in making a similar claim.
Indeed, one is justified in making a more radical claim in relation
to ethnic rights. Not only is the practical meaning of ethnic rights
contested and contestable, but so is its conceptual coherence.
Given the ease with which the phrase "ethnic rights" is currently invoked, and the numerous and urgent political questions
that invoke it, it is surprising that the concept could even be
thought to be less than clear. But it is. Even though most countries are multi-ethnic and, therefore, political communities are not
coextensive with cultural communities, the paradigm for most
influential political theories of the current era has become the
political community. Even though it is Yugoslavia rather than Iceland, India rather than Japan, that typically represent the nature
of the current nation state, it is surprisingly the latter of each of
the pairs that has formed the basis for political theorization, both

16

See generally WILLIAM E.

CONNOLLY,

IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE:

DEMOCRATIC

NEGOTIA-

TIONS OF POLITICAL PARADOX (1991); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAw (1990); IRIS YOUNG, supra note 1.
17 See W. CONNOLLY, supra note 16, at 171-84.
18 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).
19 Michael Walzer, Pluralism in Political Perspective, in THE POLITICS OF ETHNICrrY 13
(Stephen Thornstrom ed. 1982).
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on the domestic and international level. True, as I have noted
earlier and as I shall argue later, political actors and jurists have
had to pay attention to, and deal with, the issue of ethnic plurality. In most circumstances, however, they do so with the background of a theoretical and conceptual void.
A.

Ethnic Rights as Rights of Political Divorce: The Case of Secession

One relatively clear situation where the notion of ethnic rights
is invoked is secession, or, as it has come to be known in some
circles, political divorce. This specific understanding of ethnic
rights will suggest that an ethnic minority has the right to leave an
established political unit so as to constitute itself as a new unit.
The right is one of freeing oneself as a group from the jurisdiction of a political unit. This imparts a fairly clear sense of the
term, if that is in fact the meaning we want to ascribe to it. But to
agree that the term in the above sense has descriptive clarity is
not to have made the point about its normative plausibility, nor its
consistency with current international law.2"
In international legal discourse, secession is regarded as a
topic which lies in the outer periphery of the discipline, 21 and

20 "Because secessionist movements call for international recognition of the states
they seek to create, they necessarily concern the world community. The right to secede is
a matter of international law." Lea Brilmayer, &cession' and Self-Determination: A Territorial
Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT'L L 177 (1991).
21 To be sure, there are some people within the international legal community who
have been arguing that article I, paragraph 2 of the U.N. Charter, which lists as part of
the purposes of the United Nations "the principle of equal rights and self-determination
of peoples," can plausibly be read to include the right to secede. See B. Weston, et al.
Basic Documents in InternationalLaw and Order 16 (2nd ed. 1990). Those that hold such a
view believe that their argument gets added support from various General Assembly (GA)
resolutions, which repeat and emphasize the importance of the principle of
self-determination in current international social and political existence. Those that are
usually relied upon include Res. 2625, 1514, and 1541(XV). Id. at 108, 343. Two things
should be said about the position of the advocates of secession. First, the very GA resolutions they cite to support their argument declare that self-determination cannot be understood in a way that is inconsistent with another important principle of international law:
territorial integrity. Res. 1514, for example, provides: "Any attempt aimed at the partial
or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." Id. at
344. Given that, it seems rather unpersuasive to claim that self-determination must be
read expansively so as to include the right to secede. Second, not only is this claim not
on secure ground in terms of positive international law, but, more importantly, its advocates have not made a convincing moral argument in support of secession. Indeed, what
is remarkable about the literature advocating the right to' secede is its tendency to simply
list a number of arguments which are not necessarily compatible with each other.
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thus is seen mainly as the concern of allied and adjacent areas of
intellectual life. The general mood among international lawyers
and legal scholars is that positive international law does not recognize the right to secede. If positive international law is not comfortable with secession, political philosophy has not even taken it
seriously. To be sure, there are some exceptions. Allen Buchanan,
in a recent and very thoughtful
article, has gone some way to
22
neglect.
puzzling
this
redress
After exploring the various normative theories of secession
and possible objections to them, Buchanan concludes: "There is a
moral right to secede, but it is a qualified right."23 But what is
the source of that moral right, qualified or otherwise? The most
commonly invoked justification is what Buchanan refers to as
"rectificatory justice."24 The source of the right is the fact that
the particular unit within which the ethnic minority resides "was
unjustly incorporated into the larger unit from which its members
wish to secede." 25 The justification is similar to the argument that
one has the right to property that has been forcibly taken from
one. This is probably the least controversial justification for secession.
Buchanan believes that there is another justification, one he
refers to as the "discriminatory redistribution, 26 principle. This
principle holds that when a government systematically disadvantages one group, while benefiting another through economic and
regulatory policies "in morally arbitrary ways, "27 the disadvantaged
group has a moral right to leave the union. Buchanan believes
this is precisely the moral justification for the secession of the
thirteen American colonies from the British Empire in North
America.

22 "Given the practical urgency and theoretical interest of the topic, the lack of a
normative theory of secession-and even of any serious discussion of secession-in the
central works of political philosophy is puzzling." Allen Buchanan, Towrd a Theoy of
Se sion, 101 ETHIcs 322, 323 (1991). In a recent essay, Lea Brihnayer has joined the effort. Brilnayer, supra note 20.
23
'wo of the chief qualifications are (a) that secession be consistent with the requirements of distributive justice as they apply to the resources the secessionists appropriate, and (b) that secession not deprive third parties (in particular children and later
decedents of the secessionists) of their fundamental rights and liberties." Buchanan, supra
note 22, at 342.
24 Id. at 329.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 330-332.
27 Id. at 330.
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Would either of the above justifications support the desire of
ethnic minorities to relieve themselves from the jurisdiction of
existing political units? The answer will be in the affirmative if the
group can satisfy the conditions for the rectificatory argument.
Today, however, many ethnic groups will not be able to meet
those conditions. It is not in the clear colonial situations that the
right to secede is being invoked today since that situation is relatively uncommon.' 8 In any case, in those circumstances the process will be referred to as decolonization.
Most of the circumstances within which the issue of secession
arises today are of the kind where there is allegedly discriminatory
redistribution, either of material goods or intangibles. Would such
a situation justify secession of an ethnic minority? It is not quite
clear. While it might be true that political legitimacy is a function
of the state exercising power in a way that does not exploit one
group for the benefit of another, a: recognition of that principle
does not automatically and unarguably lead to the conclusion that
the exploited group thus has the right to secede. A further argument has to be made as to why the particular group is entitled to
the particular territory it now wants to reconstitute as a new political unit.'
If secession is what the notion of "the rights of ethnic minorities" is meant to refer to, then I think we need to do a great deal
more work to find normative justifications that are simultaneously
relevant to the current political conditions that have given rise to
the demand for secession, and are sensitive to the legitimate concern of the larger political units"0 from which the ethnic minority
is attempting to secede.

28 Hong Kong and New Caledonia are two of the few remaining formal colonies.
The former is a British colony which is to revert to the People's Republic of China in
1997, while the latter remains a French colony. See THE TIMES ATLAS OF THE WORLD
ix-xiii (1990).
29 See Brilmayer, supra note 20, at 192 ("My thesis is that every separatist movement
is built upon a claim to territory, usually based on an historical grievance, and that without a normatively sound claim to territory, self-determination arguments do not form a
plausible basis for secession.").
30 Take Ethiopia as an example. Its northern province, Eritrea, is almost ready to secede. If the entire territory that is now identified as Eritrea is allowed to form the new
sovereign state of Eritrea, then Ethiopia would have lost its access to the sea. Now, even

if one assumes that Eritrea has, in every other respect, the right to secede, should not
the economic and security interests of Ethiopia that will be adversely affected by loss of
access to the sea, become legitimate interests which, if not attended to, might justifiably
lead to unilateral action on the side of Ethiopia as a form of self-defense?
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In any case, even if normatively justifiable secession might not
in and of itself provide the solution to the practical problem of
inter-ethnic conflicts and domination. This is because in most
cases, there will always be ethnic minorities in any political unit regardless of the size of the constituted unit. Moreover, there will be
times when the interest of majorities and minorities will not converge. Thus, for 6xample, an independent Eritrea, if there were to
be one, would itself have to contend with ethnic minorities within
its borders. So will the newly independent nations of Latvia3 l and
Estonia,32 or Croatia," or northern and eastern Sri Lanka.'
The redrawing of political boundaries to create larger or
smaller units might therefore only reproduce the issue at a larger
or smaller level, rather than solving it. It would be like dividing
up a crystal. When a crystal is cut into smaller pieces, those small
pieces reproduce the same (molecular) structure as the original;
the size, not the structure, has changed." So it will also be in
dividing up nations or political units to solve the problem of
inter-ethnic conflicts or tensions. The size of the domain in which
conflicts take place, rather than the sources of the conflict, would
have been diminished. The seemingly perfect inter-ethnic solidarity
that is inscribed through a common alien oppressor is likely to be
raptured by the emergence of a new form of oppression and
exclusion, at times even more intense and much deeper than the

31 In Latvia 34% of the population is Russian. Latvians constitute only 52%. The remaining 14% is made up of ethnic minorities from the other republics of the Soviet
Union. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 499.
32 Estonia will, for example, have to deal with 30% ethnic Russians and another 8%
of ethnic minorities from the rest of the Union, largely from the Ukraine. Indeed, the
problem of ethnic diversity defines almost all Soviet republics and independence of any
of the remaining republics will not resolve the question of the right of ethnic minorities,
nor resolve the problem of ethnic conflict and competition. Id.
33 There is an intense conflict between the Croats who want independence for
Croatia and ethnic Serbs residing in Croatia who want to remain a part of the Yugoslav
federation. An independent Croatia, if there is to be one, would have to deal with an
ethnic minority within its borders.
34 The Tamil want an independent state consisting of the northern and eastern part
of the island. Suppose that actually came about. The new state will still have to deal with
the Moor (Muslim) community, which constitutes 30% of the population of the eastern
province of Sri Lanka, and a Sinhalese community which amounts to 23% of the population. See Marasinghe, supra note 5, at 567 n.97. The Tamil population of the eastern
province is therefore only 43%, although the northern province is nearly 95%. Id. at 570.
The point is that political divorce of a given territorial unit is not necessarily going to
bring about social and political peace, either to the new unit or the larger unit from
which the new unit emerged.
35 See I BRAG, THE CRYSTALLINE STATE: A GENERAL SURVEY 1-4 (1955) referred to in
J. M. Balkin, The Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 2 (1986).
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one from which the new political unit is attempting to escape.
This means that we will still have to grapple with the institutional
and conceptual question of how ethnic minorities can participate
fully in their polities, newly redrawn or otherwise.
Also, the day might be late for a wholesale redrawing of political maps around the world, without causing political chaos. The
political map of most of the Third World would have to be redrawn. For example, in contemporary Africa, "partly as a function
of the arbitrary boundaries inherited from colonial rule, partly as
a function of the more recent movements of people" 6 across
national boundaries, there are minority ethnic groups in most of
the member countries.3 7 It is not uncommon to find some ethnic
units residing in two or more nation-states. Given such a political
reality, the idea that we will deal effectively with the problem of
ethnic minorities simply by redrawing political boundaries might
be as unrealistic as it is dangerous. It is unrealistic for the reasons
I have just mentioned. It is also dangerous precisely because the
balkanization of nations might lead to even more chronic conflicts
among and within countries, and certainly will reduce substantially
these countries' capacity for sustained economic development by
dividing up their material and human resources.38 Under current

36

M. G. Smith, Pluralism, Race and Ethnicity in Selected African Countries, in THEORIES

OF RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 193 (1986).

37 "[T]he Third World state is usually an historically derived heterogeneous
collectivity thrown together by the processes of colonialism and welded together by the
bitter struggles of nationalist anti-colonialism. . . . [As a result,] both ethnic and racial
factors feature prominently in any attempts to achieve these goals." MARSHALL W.
MURPHREE, Ethnicity and Third World Development. Political and Academic Context, in THEORIES
OF RACE AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 157 (David Mason & John Rex eds., 1986). Indeed, it is
not only the Third World that is multi-ethnic. There are very few countries that do not
have ethnic minorities within their borders.
38 An argument could be made that the break up of current political entities will
not lead to permanent balkanization and hence to chronic conflict and economic ruin. It
could be argued that those entities that break apart are likely to reconstitute themselves,
but through an arrangement that would be more acceptable to all parties. The argument
here is based on the assumption that economic and political imperatives will invariably
bring entities together, and that for the union to last, it must be based on a voluntary
and just association. For this to happen, in many instances current arrangements must be
allowed, or even encouraged and supported, to dissolve themselves. I agree that for a
political or economic union to last it must be based on a just and voluntary association.
But I am not quite sure of the validity of the assumption that political units which have
been allowed to disintegrate will, because of political and economic imperatives, ultimately reconstitute themselves. That assumption neglects the fact that once an entity is established, there will be external and internal factors that are likely to put important constraints on the capacity of that entity to gravitate towards forming some sort of union
with other units. Externally, there could be neighbors which might see the union of that

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:615

political conditions, the notion of ethnic rights cannot be, therefore, taken to mean 'simply the rights of groups to secede from
the center, for in most situations that is unlikely to be philosophically defensible and institutionally sensible. And it certainly will
not resolve the political and institutional problems that led to
political divorce.
B. Ethnic Rights as Rights of Movement: The Case of Group Emigration
There might be another sense in which we use the notion of
rights of ethnic minorities: the right of ethnic minorities to remove themselves from the jurisdiction of the state by emigrating
from the larger political unit. 9 While the right to secede challenges the very jurisdiction of the state over a particular ethnic
minority and the territory it occupies, the right here is one of
being able to exit. This, however, seems to be a very thin right. In
any case, this does not seem to be the sense in which we use the
term rights of ethnic minorities at this point. Furthermore, if the
goal is one of emigration, then the rhetoric of ethnic rights seems
to be wholly unnecessary to achieve it. The traditional liberal argument for free movement of individuals, regardless of ethnic affiliation, seems sufficient. Indeed, that is how current international
law defends the right to emigrate.4" The notion of ethnic rights
unit with another to be an economic and political threat, and will therefore work to
undermine, either explicitly or implicitly, any attempt at such a union. Internally, the
status quo is likely to be defended by powerful interests who see -their fate to be linked
significantly with its fate. And the law of inertia, as well as the nature of the distribution
of power, tell us that changing the status quo is not an easy thing, even when it is clear
that the status quo is not functioning well from the point of view of the general welfare
of the political unit.
Lest I be misunderstood, I am not claiming that there are no circumstances at this
moment in time that would justify the total separation of an ethnic unit (a secession)
from a given territorial unit. Indeed, in some circumstances that might not only be justified, but it might be required for the very well-being of the ethnic unit. So, my argument here is not to foreclose the possibility of secession, but rather to suggest that more
than a mere identification of an ethnic unit in a given territorial unit and a complaint
by that unit must be required before secession is advocated as a solution to the problem
of inter-ethnic conflict. Otherwise, we shall be locked into a never-ending claim for secession,
39 A good example is the desire of Ethiopian and Soviet Jews to go to Israel.
40 Article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides: "Every one
has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." G.A.
Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). Article 12(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for the same right, except that in the case of
the Covenant, the state is given the right (under 12 (3)) to restrict the right if it is
"necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights
and freedoms of others." G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52 (1966).
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in this sense, as I shall show in the next section, seems either superfluous or totally devoid of meaning.
Perhaps it is meant to refer to exactly the opposite of the
above situation. Perhaps it is meant to make it impermissible for
political units and regimes who see ethnic minorities as a negation
of the majority, culturally or otherwise, to institutionally implement that vision. One of the responses of these political regimes
to minorities has been to physically remove those minorities.4' In
that regard, deportation, expulsion, or forced removal from one
part of the country to another are the obvious examples. If the
discourse of the rights of ethnic minorities is meant to make these
practices impermissible, then it is a clear and straightforward case.
Indeed, one does not even need the notion of ethnic rights in
order to argue against forced removals and deportations. Rather,
the much more secure concept of individual rights suffices. In
fact, there is a national and international consensus that the above
42
response is morally unacceptable.
C. Ethnic Rights as Individual Rights:
The Case of the Dominant Paradigm
If the rights of ethnic minorities encompasses neither secession nor emigration, then what does it encompass? It obviously
concerns the rights of ethnic minorities who remain, for one reason or another, as part of a territorial (political) entity.
I take it that this is where the organizers and editors of the
symposium want me to start, and, unfortunately, this is precisely
where it gets muddy. It gets muddy both conceptually and in an
institutional sense. Conceptually, one is not sure what the nature
of the right is and ,who the bearers of this right are. Institutionally, it is not always clear how these rights could be given expression
and what the implication of such institutionalization would be to

41 Another response to that which is seen to be a negation of one's self, is, of
course, to totally annihilate it. As I pointed out earlier, what Hitler's Germany attempted
to do to the Jews is perhaps the most prominent example of this measure. But annihilation does not take only physical forn. At times it assumes a psychological dimension.
Slavery, for example, is psychological annihilation. It is a social death where the slave's
personhood is totally negated.
42 Article 13(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that "every
one has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each
State." GA. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). The same right is reproduced
in article 12(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993"U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
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the general structure of the larger polity. Is the notion of ethnic
rights one of individual rights of members of the ethnic group, or
is it a right of the group? If it is the former, then do we need to
use the phrase "rights of ethnic minorities" at all? If it is the latter, then what is 'the nature of that right and how does it express
itself in institutional terms?
These are some of the questions we must confront, since lack
of clarity in our response to these questions has had an enormously negative impact in two senses. First, the declaration of the
existence of such a right has not usually been accompanied with
visible institutional implementation. Part of the reason is undoubtedly the lack of clarity about the nature of the right to be conferred and protected. Second, there has been official and popular
apprehension, even hostility, toward such rights. Perhaps a clarification of the nature of the right and of its institutional implication might reduce the level of anxiety both among officials and
the dominant majority.
1. Ethnic Rights: The Individualist Challenge
The dominant perspective, "the individualist perspective" as I
shall refer to it, holds that the notion of ethnic rights, if it is not
meant to refer to secession, can ultimately be understood only as
individual rights. The individualist seeks to persuade us of the conceptual plausibility and practical desirability of this position with
two alternative arguments. The first, which for convenience sake
we might refer to as "methodological individualism," contends
that, since the individual is the ultimate agent of action, it is only
to that agent a moral right could attach.4" Groups here are seen

43 As Daniel Bell put it:"The principle of equal opportunity derives from a fundamental tenet of classical liberalism: that the individual-and not the family, the community or the state-is the basic unit to society." Daniel Bell, Meritocracy and Equality, 29
PUBLIC INTEREST 40 (Fall 1972). The individualist does not deny that the law could constitute a group and confer rights on that group. Indeed, there are numerous entities
which form part of the set of institutions that define what we loosely refer to as the
liberal order. Entities like the corporation, even the state (or State), are legally constituted and rights are conferred on them. The individualist will have no objection to
speaking about groups and group rights if the reference is to those entities. Mark
Tushnet refers to these entities as "artificial groups." Mark Tushnet, Law and Group
Rights: Federalism as a Mode4 in LAW AND THE COMMUNrrY: THE END OF INDIVIDUALISM?
281 (Leslie Green & Allan C. Hutchinson eds., 1989). See also MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS,
PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986); MICHAEL MCDONALD, The Personless Paradigm, 37 U. TORONTO L. J. 212 (1987). The resis-

tance from the individualist to group rights arises when the groups in question are what
can be referred to as "natural groups," whose rights are seen to be moral rights in need
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merely as collections of individual agents, aggregations of the
constituent parts. To the methodological individualist, the concept
of group rights is "a metaphysical absurdity." Only individuals can
have rights, for only they can be treated justly or unjustly."
Methodological individualism tends, therefore, to be hostile to the
notion and rhetoric of ethnic rights.4"
The second, "consequential individualism" as I shall call it,
might concede the possibility of the conceptual coherence of the
notion of group rights, and is not necessarily hostile to the rhetoric of ethnic rights. But it sees the concept of group rights in
strategic and temporary terms. This concept is to be deployed, not
because groups are units of moral worth or because there is an
intrinsic value in conferring rights on groups, but because .that
*might be the only way to correct structural and institutional defects which are seen to be impediments to treating people as individuals.4" Indeed, the recognition of group rights is seen in paradoxical terms. One took note of it so as ultimately to banish it.

of legal recognition. It is the implication that there are irreducibly natural entities of
moral worth, other than the individual person, that raises the concern of the individualist. So, when I talk about the hostility of the individualist towards group rights I mean to
refer to the conferring of legal rights on "natural groups" whose claims are seen to be
moral claims.
44 Robert Paul Wolff describes the individualist position this way: "Manifestly, all
suffering is someone's suffering, all joy someone's joy and only an individual agent can
have a right or a duty." Robert Paul Wolff, The Concept of Social Justice, in FROM CONTRACr TO COMMUNrIY: POLITICAL THEORY AT THE CROSSROADS 68 (Fred R. Dalimayr ed.

1978).
45 Nathan Glazer, who has been one of the most prominent critics of the notion of
group rights in general, and of affirmative action in particular, argues:
If we are a society in which individuals are treated as individuals by public bodies, and as far as possible in private life, without regard to race and ethnicity,
then we cannot get there by allowing or prescribing public actions in the opposite direction, even on a temporary basis.
Nathan Glazer, Why Bakke Won't End Reverse Discrimination, in PUBLIC POLCY:. ISSUES, ANALYSIS AND IDEOLOGY (1982). See also Justice Scalia's statement in his concurrence in City of
Richmond v. J. A. Crosson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). "The relevant proposition is not
that it was blacks, or Jews, or Irish who were discriminated against, but it was individual
men and women, 'created equal,' who were discriminated against." Id. at 528.
46 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL- & PUB. AFF. 107
(1976); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32-45 (1987). Consequential
individualism acknowledges the existence of social groups and the differences of perspective among them. But it attributes both of these to power and social inequalities. According to this view, the differences among groups will be transcended when the social conditions that gave rise to and perpetuate those differences are overcome. However, transcending those group differences would first require taking into account the reality of
those differences.
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This was the guiding principle of the United States Supreme
Court in the '60s and '70s when dealing with race conscious remedies. Perhaps Justice Blackmun expressed that view most eloquently in Bakke4 7 when he observed, "In order to get beyond racism,
we must first take account of race. There is no other way."4"
Individualism, in either of its versions, is also uneasy about
the practical implication of such a right to social peace and political harmony. The argument here is that to confer rights on
groups is to heighten the sense of group affiliation of members
and to make politics a battle between permanently warring factions. In this battle, intolerance, prejudice, and stereotyping will
govern the interaction between groups and the ultimate losers will
be the very groups who are supposed to be helped with the notion of rights-minorities.' 9 Indeed, the individualist paints an
unsettling picture to attract our attention to what he sees as the.
dangerous consequence of recognizing group rights. He invokes
the image of "apartheid."5

47 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
48 Id. at 407 (separate opinion).
49 The uneasiness about the practical implication of the notion of ethnic minorities
is also felt by a section of the left which sees the emphasis on ethnic identity as a recipe
for political diversion and quietism. The fear is informed by the belief that ethnic consciousness will lead to ethnic division, which will weaken the possibility of alignment
among, and a common action by, the politically and economically disenfranchised. Irving
Howe puts it this way: "Social militancy may not always be undermined, social solidarity
may not always be threatened, by ethnic or social consciousness; but too often, in the
past, they have been." Irving Howe, The Limits of Ethnicity, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 25,
1917, at 19.
50 Justice Kennedy of the United States Supreme Court, for one, is convinced that
this is what affirmative action, or what is left of it, in the United States is leading towards. Dissenting in Metro Broadcasting Inc., v. Federal Communications Commission,
110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990), he observed:
The Court is all too correct that the type of reasoning employed by the Commission and Congress [that there may be important differences between the
broadcasting practices of minority owners and those of their non-minority
counterparts] is not novel . . . . The following statement [the official justification for apartheid], for example, would fit well among those offered to uphold
the Commission's racial preference policy: 'The policy is not based on any concept of superiority or inferiority, but merely on the fact that people differ, particularly in their group associations, loyalties, cultures, outlook, modes of life and
standards of development.'
110 S. Ct. at 3046 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
The symmetry Justice Kennedy manages to see in the claims and institutional manifestations of Apartheid on the one hand, and affinnative action on the other, is a false
symmetry. Apartheid is based on the belief that one group is superior to another, and
the system is designed to perpetuate massive disparities among groups. The homelands
policy was not inforned by respect for the cultures of the various black groups in the
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There are, therefore, four things that define the individualist
approach.51 First, the approach embraces the Enlightenment's assumption of a universal, stable, and to a large extent, pre-social,
individual identity. The individual so conceived is seen to be owed
certain rights in virtue of her humanity regardless of the social,
political, and historical conditions within which she lives. Second,
individualism assumes that the only unit of our moral concern is,
or should be, the individual. As John Rawls put it, the individual is
the only "self-originating source of valid claims."" Therefore,
groups cannot be sources of our moral concern. Third, the approach claims that it is only through the process of treating people as individuals that we will be able to show that every individual
has equal moral status,5" and should be treated, to use a phrase
made popular by Ronald Dworkin, with respect and equal concern. 4 Fourth, individualism makes an empirical claim that it is
only when the individual is taken as the point of departure that
social harmony and peace ultimately will be ensured.
In terms of ethnic minorities, the individualist project will
translate itself in the following manner. The ultimate objective of
ethnic rights is seen to be one of ensuring that members of an
ethnic minority are treated without discrimination in relation to
members of the majority or the dominant group. That is, members of ethnic minorities have the same sort of (formal) rights
and entitlements as members of other groups. The best way to

country. Rather, it was motivated by undisguised contempt for these groups and their
cultures. To compare this to affirmative action policies, whose purpose is to bring about
social equality for, and active participation by, oppressed minorities in the life of the
polity, is very puzzling.
51 As is obvious from the discussion in the above pages, both methodological and
consequential individualism have an ethical dimension. Both hold that social relations and
institutions are to be judged by the extent to which they cultivate and promote the interest and ends of the individual. In its methodological moments, individualism denies the
reality of groups, while in its consequentialist moments, it contests the desirability of 'the
concept.
52 John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. OF PHIL 515, 543 (1980),
cited in KYMucKA, infra note 65, at 140.
53 To be sure, not all individualists agree as to what would constitute equal treatment and what sort of rights should attach to the unit of our moral concern. But they
all agree that the individual is the only unit of moral worth and individuals must be
treated equally.
54 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180-83, 270-74 (1978). "We may
therefore say that justice as fairness rests on the assumption of a natural right of all men
and women to equality of concern and respect, a right they possess not by virtue of
birth or characteristic or merit or excellence but simply as human beings with the capacity to make plans and give justice." Id. at 182.
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achieve this is to recognize and protect individual rights and to
make the treatment of individuals the point of comparison. Assimilation is the political and legal (institutional) response consistent
with the above individualist view.
Currently, assimilation is the most common response to ethnic
differences. Assimilation is premised on two assumptions, one
practical and the other philosophical. The practical dimension
holds that nationhood and development will be possible only
when there are uniform cultural outlooks and a common language. One does not have to go very far to find an example of
discourse informed by this assumption. Supporters of the
English-only debate in this country cite nationhood and development as possible casualties of what Dennis Baron refers to as
"plurilingualism."5 5 Philosophically, assimilation is seen to be desirable, for once the assimilation process is completed, then, so
the argument goes, it will be easier to treat every one as an individual rather than as a member of a group. Insofar as individual
treatment is seen to be both politically possible and philosophically defensible, then assimilation is seen to be an indispensable first
step towards that goal. As such, the assimilationist sees himself to
be in the tradition of classical liberalism, committed to making the
individual both the point of departure and the telos, the ultimate
agent of action and the ultimate beneficiary of institutional actions.
It is worth mentioning here that, as ironic and as implausible
as it may sound, the individualist has an ally in the Marxist when
the question is one of the rights of ethnic minorities. Just like the
individualist, the Marxist is suspicious of ethnic groups, for he, like
the individualist, conceives of the universal individual to be constituted by factors that go beyond the particular ethnic group to
which the individual belongs.56 To be sure, the two have radically
different conceptions of the nature of the individual and how that

55

DENNIS

E.

BARON,

THE

ENGLISH-ONLY

QUESTION:

AN

OFFICIAL

LANGUAGE

FOR

AMERJcANs? 179 (1990).
56 John Hazard, the pre-eminent student of Soviet law and Soviet society, reports
that before the October Revolution, when Lenin and his comrades were organizing the
Revolution, some demanded that ethnic differences be recognized and that some form of

autonomy be granted to them. Lenin argued that there was no reason
tion. "[W]hen his Jewish party comrades expressed a desire to create
revolutionary organization, the 'Bund,' Lenin insisted that there was
autonomous unit. All communists were expected to put aside their
their nationalistic sentiments when enlisting under the working class
Hazard, Socialism and Federation, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1182, 1185 (1984).

for such organizaa separate Jewish
no reason for an
ethnic origin and
banner." John N.
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individual is constituted. But both agree that the factors that define the individual are not group-specific. For the individualist,
there is such a thing as a universal, transcendental nature. For the
Marxist, the universalizing factor is not a transcendental human
nature, but the relationship of people to the means of production-i.e., class, if one is talking about capitalist societies, and the
new set of institutions which produce the new man, if one is talking about a socialist society. Indeed, the most prominent promise
of Marxism is that under a socialist society group affiliation will
disappear and that the measure of things will be the new socialist
man.
2.

The Individualist Perspective Legalized

It is the individualist perspective which has, by and large,
informed existing national 7 and international documents that attempt to speak to the needs of ethnic minorities.5s Once one

57 See, eg., Section 10 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (Australia).
Sub-section 10(1) reads that members of ethnic minorities are to enjoy the same right

"to the same extent as persons of (the dominant group]." The Equal Protection Clause
of the United States Constitution has generally been read to embody the individualist

anti-discrimination (non-discrimination) principle. Indeed, Equal Protection jurisprudence
in the United States has had a major influence on the nature of international documents
in the area. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
A look att the constitutions of selected countries shows the dominance of the individualistic non-discrimination principle. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Ger-

many provides: "No one may be prejudiced or favoured because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions." F.R.G. Basic Law Pt I, art. 3, § 3. The Egyptian Constitution provides:
"All citizens are equal before the law. They have equal public rights and duties without
discrimination between them due to race, ethnic origin, language, religion or creed."
CONST1TUTION OF EGYr, pt. 3 III, art. 40. The Malaysian Constitution provides: "Except
as expressly authorized by this Constitution, there shall be no discrimination against citizens on the gound only of religion, race, descent or place of birth .... " -CONSTITUTION
OF MALANSIA, pt. II, art. 8, § 2. The above English translations are contained in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991).
58 It must be mentioned here that the suspicion about the value of ethnic rights is
not limited to those whose institutions and/or theoretical constructs are informed by the
liberal assumption of the individual and social life. Indeed, some of the most illiberal
polities in the developing world are as unpersuaded about the value of recognizing group
rights. The African response to ethnic minorities is a good example. The emphasis in
many of the African countries is on national solidarity and territorial integrity. Indeed,
since the establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the primary interest
of individual countries as well as regional organizations, like the OAU itself, has been to
insist on and reinforce the concept of national unity. Given such preoccupation with
unity, the notion of ethnic rights is looked at very suspiciously. The African Charter on
Human and People's Rights, the major regional human rights document, does not offer
minorities very much. Indeed, from reading the document one would think and conclude
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concludes that the individual is the only unit of moral worth, and
that groups have no moral existence, it then follows that constitutional and legislative efforts must not differentiate on ethnic
grounds. If there is to be such differentiation, then it must conform to the requirements of consequential individualism. If there
is affirmative action, for example, it must be temporary. 9
Indeed, in relation to international documents, at least those
of the post-World War II era,' individual human rights provided

that the "problem" of minorities is not an African "problem." The Charter simply refers
to the rights of "peoples," without defining the term "peoples," and does not use the
term minorities. To be sure, the Preamble and article 2 prohibit discrimination on the
basis of race, ethnic group, colour, etc. But these prohibitions do not imply the existence
of minorities as groups. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), uprinted 21 I.L.M.
59 [hereinafter Arrican Charter].
59 Article 2, paragraph 2, of The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, for example, states:
Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social, economic,
cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate
development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to
them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case entail
as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.
Opened for signature Mar.

7,

1966,

660

U.N.T.S.

195

(entered

into force Jan.

4,

1969) [hereinafter Convention on Racial Discrimination].
60 It is interesting to note that in the pre-World War II period (following the end
of World War I) there was, under the aegis of the League of Nations and the Permnanent Court of Justice, a system of treaties and other arrangements to protect minorities
as minority groups rather than as individuals, as current human rights law tends to do.
See Case Concerning Minority Schools in Albania PCIJ Ser. A/B No. 64 (1935) 18. See
also FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC,
RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES, at 16-26, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 U.N.
Sales No.E.78XIV.1 (1979); NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-11 (1991); Joseph B. Kelly, National Minorities in International Law, 3
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POLICY 253 (1973).

Under the League system, minority rights included the positive right of cultural
identity. And unlike the United Nations system, which conspicuously downgraded the
question of the protection of minorities by assigning the responsibility to "a relatively
powerless subcomxnission of the Economic and Social Council, the League system provided formal guarantee of minority rights by the international community's most powerful
agency-the League Council itself." ROBERT G. WIRSING, Dimensions of Minority Protection,
in PROTECTION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 10 (Robert G. Wirsing
ed., 1981). One, however, ought not overplay the virtue of the League's system of protection. As Wirsing notes, it had limited territorial and substantive application, and, more
importantly, it did not prevent the European "slide into renewed warfare." Id.
It is no accident that the individualist perspective informed the international documents drawn up in the early days of the United Nations. One can think of two major
reasons for such orientation. The first, and perhaps the more important, is that this
emphasis on individual rights was in many ways a response to what was perceived to be
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the mode of discourse in the United Nations and other venues.
The earlier, and perhaps the two most well known, documents of
the international community, the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, took the position that rights are to be
conferred on individuals as individuals, rather than as members of
groups. In fact, neither of the documents considers the question
of minorities. The Charter, for example, provides in article 1, section 3, as part of the purposes of the United Nations, the promotion and encouragement of "respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion." 61 There is no mention of ethnic rights.
Similarly, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not
deal with minority rights. In language similar to that of the Charter, article 2 of-the Declaration provides that "[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."' The Charter and the Declaration are, therefore, examples of methodological individualism
given legal and textual expression.'

one of the causes of the horrors of the war that the world had just gone through: group
thinking. The attempt by the Nazis to exterminate Jews was seen to be nothing but the
most perverse manifestation oT thinking in terms of groups and the supposed differences
among them. The remedy to the consequences of group thinking was thought to be
thinking in terms of the individual and to make the individual the unit of our moral
concern. Individuals, by virtue of the fact that they are individuals, are seen to have certain rights. To say that individuals have universal human rights "is not just to think of
them as right holders but also to think of them as equal in a morally significant respect" DAVID LyoNs, Introduction, in RIGHTS 12 (1979).
There was a second reason for the dominance of the individualist perspective. This
has to do with the structure of international relations in the immediate era of the
post-war period. After the war, the United States emerged as the most dominant power
on the international scene, exercising enormous power both within and without the United Nations. The international documents in some ways reflected the conceptual scheme
that informed institutions and institutional structures within the United States. The individualist orientation of the documents was therefore a barometer of the sort of political
influence exercised by the United States.
61 U.N. CHARTER, art. 1, para. 3. Article 55 of the Charter provides that the United
Nations is organized to promote human rights for all without distinction on the basis of
race, sex, language, or religion. And under article 56, all members of the United Nations
pledge to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the United Nations to
achieve the goals set out in article 55.
62 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 72 (1948).
63 Many of the regional human rights documents have sinmilar provisions. See, e.g.,
article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human. Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; the Preamble and article II of The
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Some of the later documents appear to take groups seriously
and to conceive of them as capable of being units of our concern.
Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, for example, provides:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other members of
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language.'
Nevertheless, a close reading of the article suggests that ultimately that which is protected is the right of the individual to
choose with whom to associate and under what conditions, rather
than the rights of the groups which are mentioned in the article.
"[P]ersons belonging to" ethnic minorities, not ethnic minorities
themselves, are the beneficiaries of the right set out in article 27.
Ethnic minorities as a group are singled out as a point of focus
merely because it is the members of such a group who are usually
denied the rights granted to the members of the majority. So, the
explicit concern with ethnic minorities as a group here is in fact
regarded as a first step towards making group affiliation irrelevant
in the treatment of individuals.
Article 27 of the Covenant, therefore, does not create, as it
appears with a first reading, a space for group rights with "the
moral ontology of [individualism],"65 but it reaffirms an important dimension of the individualist project: the individual right to
freedom of association. The teaching of article 27 is simply that
individual choices must not be constrained by the state for one
group of individuals more than it is for another group of individuals.'

American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Res. XXX of the 9th International Conference of American States (1953), reprinted in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM pt. 1, ch. 4 (T. Buergenthal and R. Norris eds., 1984); articles 1 & 24 of
The American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, reprinted in OAS, Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System 25, OEA/Ser.
L/V/II.71, Doc. 6, rev. 1 (1988); and articles 2, 3 and 19 of The African Charter on
Human and Peoples Rights, supra note 58.
64 G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) [hereinafter referred to as the "Covenant'].
65 WILL KymucmA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 140 (1989).
66 Vernon van Dyke, a keen student of minority rights, also made the following observation: "The Covenant [ICCPR] includes an article on minorities, the statement being
that 'persons belonging to . . . minorities' shall not be denied certain rights. The clear
intent is to avoid giving minorities any basis for a claim of a collective right." Vernon
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True, there are some international documents which seem to
grant ethnic minorities more than article 27 of the Covenant does.
Article 2(2) of the Convention on Racial Discrimination, for example, states that:
States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant,
take, in the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special
and. concrete measures to ensure the adequate development
and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging
equal
to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing the full and
67
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Unlike article 27 of the Covenant, which requires the state to
be neutral in relation to individual choices, here the state is allowed to intervene actively to assist minority groups. The special
measures contemplated here are not conditioned on a showing of
individual injustice or individual suffering. Nor are they dependent
on the identification of individual responsibility. It seems to follow,
then, that they are responding to group injustice, and consequently the rights are group rights.
There is, however, a limit to this apparent recognition of
group rights. For instance, the special measures are to be temporary. This means that the notion of group rights is in fact being
recognized in instrumental terms. Similar to what the equal protection jurisprudence in the United States does, the reality of
groups is here being acknowledged so as ultimately to remove the
conditions for their existence. Consequential individualism is what

van Dyke, Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems in Liberal-Democratic Thought, 44 J. OF
PoLITIcs 21, 25 (1982). Cf "CAPOTORTI, supra note 60:
Nevertheless, there is reason to question whether the implementation of article
27 of the Covenant does not, in fact, call for active intervention by the State. At
the cultural level, in particular, it is generally agreed that, because of the enormous human and financial resources which would be needed for a full cultural
development, the right granted to members of minority groups to enjoy their
own culture would lose much of its meaning if no assistance from the Government concerned was forthcoming. Neither the non-prohibition of the exercise of
such a right by persons belonging to minority groups nor the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of expression and association are sufficient for the effective implementation of the right of members of minority groups to preserve and
develop their own culture.
Id. at 36.
67 See also Convention on Racial Discrimination, supra note 59, at art. 1(4). Article
4(1) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women provides for a similar right. GA. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) 194,
U.N. Doc. A/34/830 (1979).
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the affirmative action provisions embody. Affirmative action provisions neither see groups as units of moral worth, nor do they see
group membership to constitute individual identity. Rather, the
objective of the temporary measures set out in the international
documents is to provide the conditions that would allow members
of minority groups to make choices with as much freedom as
members of other groups.
Both methodological individualism and consequential individualism see the appropriate unit of action, the choosing agent, to be
the unencumbered individual-the individual qua individual or the
individual as a citizen. Consequential individualism denies the
desirability of groups, while methodological individualism denies
even their reality.
3.

The Communitarian Challenge to the Individualist Perspective
[T] he story of my life is always embedded in the story of those
communities from which I derive my identity.
-. Alasdair MacIntyrel

The individualist perspective has, in recent times, come under
serious challenge in relation to its descriptive capacity, the desirability of its normative position, and the enormously negative copsequences of its position for minorities.
In terms of its descriptive capacity, the complaint is a general
one. The argument is that the concept of the self (which is to be
the bearer of rights), the individualist assumes, is at variance with
what social life teaches us. The narrative of the presocial and autonomous self, the heroic individual, who stands against the threat
of society, and whose confrontation with society is to be assisted
with the notion of rights is a misleading one, says the critique.
That position empties the self of the traditions and attachments
which are the very stuff that constitute it.69 The autonomously

68

ALASDAIR C. MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 221 (1981).
69 This is generally referred to as the communitarian critique of liberalism ("individualism" as I have chosen to refer to it). At times, the communitarian critique of liberalism seems to go in two seemingly contradictory directions. As Michael Walzer has pointed out, there are times when the critique appears to be directed at liberal social practice. But there are other times where the complaint seems to be about liberal theory,
not liberal practice. In its first dimension, the communitarian critique assumes that liberal
theory accurately reflects a defective liberal social practice, and that the critique is, therefore, about the defective social existence that is accurately represented, and celebrated, by
liberal theory. The second aspect of the critique quarrels with the way liberal theory has
characterized social life. The argument here is that liberal theory "radically misrepresents
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641

choosing individual whose sense of self is not implicated by the
choices he makes, and the traditions within which he makes them,
is one who exists only in the imagination of the individualist. For
Charles Taylor, for example, to think of the individual in the way
in which the individualist thinks of him, is to think of "a void in
which nothing would be worth doing, nothing would deserve to
count for anything, [for] [t]he self which has arrived at freedom
by setting aside all external obstacles and impingements is characterless, and hence without defined purpose, however much this is
hidden by such seemingly positive terms as 'rationality' or
70
'creativity."'
The argument, therefore, is that the individual is always situated in a particular tradition, plays certain roles, and has commitments and relationships. Those conditions give meaning to the
notion of individual choice, for they specify the content of, and
provide the inspiration for, the individual's action. The notion of
a freely determining individual who can suspend herself on a web
71
of transcendental thread is nothing more than an abstraction.

real life." The radically situated and autonomous individual that the liberal theorist constructs does not exist in real life. See Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalinm, 18 POL THEORY 6, 7 (1990).
In this Article, when I talk about the communitarian critique of individualism, I
refer to the second variety. I take that to be the major critique. But I must also say that,
even though the two critiques appear to be contradictory and that Professor Walzer is
right in seeing the tension between the two positions, it might not be right, contrary to
Professor Walzer's insistence, that the two are inherently contradictory and that "each of
the arguments is right in a way that undercuts the value of the other." Walzer's argument is that you cannot simultaneously maintain that liberal societies are devoid of
communitarian possibilities, as the first critique would have it, and that the "deep structures even of liberal societies is in fact communitarian." Id. at 10. In my view, the two
critiques can be seen to be complementary rather than contradictory. It could be that
liberal theory does in fact misrepresent social life in that it emphasizes some aspects of
social life at the expense of others, but that misrepresentation will also have an important impact upon how consequent social practice takes form. In so far as theory can be
seen to be constitutive of practice, defective description does not remain in the realm of
theory. Over time it has a significant impact on what form social practice takes.
70 CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL AND MODERN SOcIETY 157 (1979). See also MACINTYRE
supra note 68, at 204-06 (1981); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179 (1982) ("To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attlchnients . . . is not
to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without
character, without moral depth.").
71 "[F]reedom . . . to be pursued for its orn sake [is] empty. [T]here has to be
some project that is worth pursuing, some task that is worth fulfilling . . . . [A] valuable
life, for most of us, will be a life filled with commitments and relationships." WILL
KymiucKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 48-49 (1989).
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The culture and tradition that surround the individual are ones
that enable her to continue to tell stories about herself, and make
it possible for her to continue to make choices and define her
life. Once the individual is seen to be at least partially constituted
by the tradition to which she belongs, those narratives the group
tells about itself, both to itself and others, then the fate of the
individual is tied to the fate of the group and tradition. One cannot have a right as an abstract individual. Rather, one has a right
as a member of a particular group and tradition, and within a
given context.
The first challenge to the individualist is therefore a challenge
to its universalist, abstract, conception of the self. The complaint is
that it is a defective description of social life, a radical misrepresentation of real life.72
This concept of the self is also normatively undesirable, according to critics, because, as Michael Walzer put it, "[i]t generates a radical individualism and then a radical competition among
self-seeking individuals."7' It follows that a political culture committed to such an individualist conception of the self will find it
difficult to move in the direction of effective egalitarian and social74
ly just society.

I am someone's son or daughter, someone else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen
of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to
this clan, that tribe, this nation. Hence what is good for me has to be the good
for one who inhabits these roles.
MACINTYRE, supra note 68, at 220.
72 See Michael Walzer, The Communitarian COiique of Liberalism, 18 POL THEORY 6, 7-9
(1990).
73 MICHAEL WALZER, RADICAL PRINCIPLES: REFLECTIONS OF AN UNRECONSTRUCTED
DEMOCRAT 92, 98 (1980).
74 Mark Tushnet makes this point in relation to the concept of rights. Tushnet first
observes that the concept of rights has -in individualistic bias. He then goes on to observe that the argument has been made that this bias makes it more difficult to make
"movements in the direction of general social justice and greater material equality more
difficult in societies committed to the idea of individual rights." Mark Tushnet, Law and
Group Rights: Federalism as a Mode4 in LAW AND THE COMMUNITY. THE END OF INDMDUALISM? 277, 279 (1989).
As will be apparent in this Article, I am not convinced by the argument that the
concept of rights is inherently individualistic. For my present purpose, however, I do not
have to accept that part of Tushnet's observation. What I do agree with is his observation that, in a political culture committed to an individualistic conception of the self, it
will be more difficult to move in the direction of a more effectively egalitarian and socially just society.
For a view contrary to Tushnet's, regarding the strategic relevance of the concept of
rights for progressive social change, see Alan Hunt, Rights and Social Movements:
Counter-Hegemonic Strategies, 17 J. L. Soc'Y. 309, 310 (1990). ("I will advance and defend
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In terms of the practical consequences of the above conception of the self to members of ethnic minorities, the implication
seems to be obvious. The individualist claims that her objective is
to treat individuals equally, and that she does so by treating them
as abstract individuals rather than as members of a group. In
reality, for members of minority ethnic groups, having equal treatment turns out to be merely the right to be turned into some version of the members of the dominant culture. One can treat individuals equally only if one is comparing them from a given point
of view. That point of view is not the abstract individual, for there
is not such a creature, but rather the individual who is located in
and defined by the dominant culture and tradition.
In addition, the individualist argument that to treat individuals equally is to simply allow them to associate with whomever they
want has, although seemingly neutral in relation to each individual
and each cultural group, a greatly disproportionate negative impact on ethnic minorities. As Will Kymlicka has argued, what this
apparent neutrality masks is the fact that minority cultures, unlike
the dominant culture, - are vulnerable to the decisions of
non-minority groups. Dominant majority groups are able to outvote and outbid the minority groups regarding the resources crucial to the survival of the latter's cultures. This is a threat that the
dominant group does not face. 5

the thesis that to achieve the project of counter-hegemonic political strategy requires the
transition from the 'discourse of interests' to the 'discourse of rights.'"). See also Robert
A. Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of InternationalHuman Rights Law: Redefining the
Terms .of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DuKE L.J. 660, 701 ("In the context
of the contemporary indigenous struggle for survival and international legal protection,
rights discourse has functioned effectively in generating a shared, empowering vocabulary
and syntax for indigenous peoples. The discourse of international human rights has enabled indigenous peoples to understand and express their oppression in terms that are
meaningful to them and their oppressors. Thinking in terms of rights has organized
indigenous peoples on a global scale to combat their shared experiences of being excluded and oppressed by the dominant world order.").
75 Will Kymlicka, Liberalin, Individualism, and Minority Rights, in LAW AND THE COMMuNrry 181, 196 (1989). Kymlicka, arguing for an affirmative governmental protection of
Aboriginal cultural membership in Canada, expresses the reason for such protection as
follows:
The point isn't that aboriginal people care more about cultural community than
Aboriginal
others. We all care about the fate of our cultural community ....
fears about the fate of their cultural structure, however, are not paranoia-there
are real threats. The English and French in Canada rarely have to worry about
the fate of their cultural structure. They get for free what aboriginal peoples
have to pay for; security of their cultural structure. That is an important inequality, and if it is ignored, it becomes an important injustice. Special political
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Take, for example, the Aboriginal people of Australia, a people which was, and has been, subjected to one of the most brutal
treatments of an indigenous people by a colonizing power. What
does it mean to say that Aboriginal people enjoy the same right as
European Australians for their culture to compete in the marketplace of cultural values? It is a hollow right. Aboriginal people are
76
only slightly more than one percent of the entire population.
In the past, their culture was systematically undermined by the
government. Under such circumstances, to claim that the Aboriginal people can place their cultural practices in the marketplace of
cultures is to be oblivious to two crucial facts. First, the government has had an important role in undermining the competitive
capacity of the Aboriginal culture. 77 Secondly, the Aboriginal people will be outvoted and outbid by European Australians in relation to the resources needed for the survival and the flourishing
of their culture. The majority will determine the fate of the culture that it has always seen as the Other.
What a seemingly neutral state purports not to affirm, is affirmed for it by a market which acts as its surrogate. In matters of

rights, however, serve to correct this inequality by ensuring that the aboriginal
communities are as secure as non-aboriginal ones. People should have to pay for
the costs of their choices, but special political rights are necessary to remove inequalities in the context of choice which arise before people even make their
choices ....
If [the goal is] that no one is penalized or disadvantaged by their natural

or social endowment, but allow people's fate to vary with their choices about
how to lead their lives . . . then it must be recognized that the members of a
minority culture can face inequalities that are the product of their circumstances
or endowment, not their choices or ambitions. And since this inequality would
remain even if individual members of aboriginal communities no longer suffered
from any deprivation of material resources, temporary affirmative action programs are not enough to ensure genuine equality. Collective rights may be needed.
Id. at 198.
76 Garth Nettheim, Indigenous Rights, Human Rights and Australia, 61 AUSTL. L.J., 291,

293 (1987).
77 Australian courts have, for example, refused to recognize Aboriginal law, even
though the Australian Law Reform Commission recommended such a recognition. See
Nettheinm, supra note 76, at 293, citing The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Law
A.L.R.C. 31 (AGPS, Canberra, 1986). See also Australian Law Reform Comnission, Reform,
Jan. 1989, No. 53 at 32 ("With very limited exceptions Aboriginal customary laws have
not been recognized."), Australian Law Reform Commission 31, for example, recommended the recognition of, among other things, traditional Aboriginal marriages, the Aboriginal child placement principle, which emphasizes the placement of Aboriginal children in
need of care with the Aboriginal community, and Aboriginal customary law in relation to
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights.
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group affiliation, state neutrality, in the face of unequal circumstances between minorities and majorities, is nothing less than an
affirmation of one particular way of life and a deconstitution of
another.
There is another undesirable practical implication of the individualist project. By de-emphasizing the constitutive dimension of
culture and traditi6n, and by undermining the culture and traditi6n of minority groups, it breeds social dislocation and social
pathology among members of those groups. 78 For to destroy the
cultural framework is to destroy the framework within which
choices can be made.
It also cures the society of the possibility of counter-narratives,
narratives that might continually disturb the totalizing tendencies
of the dominant narrative, "the ideological maneuvers through79
which 'imagined communities' are given essentialist identities."
The argument here is that the individualist, while professing to be
a friend of the individual and skeptical of, even hostile to, the notion of groups, is in fact totalizing. Assimilation is nothing but one
form of totalizing, in that it is out to destroy the possibility of
counter-narratives and, hence, the possibility of challenge and
change.
4. Communitarians And Ethnic Rights: The Totalizing Tendency
The communitarian critique, while persuasive about the defective conception of the individualist self both normatively and descriptively, is itself not immune from a serious challenge. Indeed,

78 The condition of Australian Aboriginals clearly illustrates this implication. According to a recent report, the life expectancy of an Aboriginal is twenty years less than that
of a white Australian. Alcoholism, which is widespread among the Aboriginals, contributes to this decreased life expectancy. Perry, Australian Aboriginal L fe--Disease, Despair,
Death, The Reuters Library Report, June 14, 1991. See also Seltzer, Acculturation and Mental Disorder in the Inuit, 25 CANADIAN J. OF PSYCHOLOGY 17 (1980), cited in Kymlicka, supra
note 75, at 191.
79 HoMI L BHABHA, DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and, the Margins of the Modern Nation, in NATION AND NARRATION 300 (1990). Recently, a group of minority legal scholars
in this country has forcefully argued that storytelling (narrative) by minorities serves a
strategic function as an oppositional counter-hegemonic activity. See DERRICK A. BELL, AND
WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTIcE

(1987); Richard Delgado,

Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. RE. 2411 (1989);
Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95
(1990); Patricia J. Williams, Aldemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987); and see generally Symposium: Legal Stmytelling, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989). See also Hunt, supra note 74, at 310.
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the most effective challenge is a counter attack from the individualist. The claim is that the communitarian self is so
thickly-constituted that the notion of an individual as an agent
loses all meaning. This will be the condition for authoritarian
social arrangements.
The authoritarian charge against communitarians is directed
on two levels, aimed at the two versions of communitarianism. On
one level, the complaint is against what can be referred to as the
localist communitarian, one who takes local communities, rather
than political communities, as sources of culture and the stuff that
constitutes the individual. Here, the complaint is that, in so far as
the communitarian emphasizes the constitutive nature of these
local communities and glorifies and protects them, he is prescribing the condition for closed, local communities. Such communities
are likely to stifle the full development of their members by puting formal and informal restrictions upon the members, both in
terms of exit and reentry. In addition, the institutional implication
of the localist conception of community is the emergence and
proliferation of insulated and exclusionary communities.
The charge of authoritarianism against the nationalist version
of communitarianism is directed at what is seen to be the totalizing tendency of the traditions and cultures that are invoked. This
concern is a legitimate one, for when the leading communitarians
complain about the loss of meaning and solidarity in modern life,
they have "grand" traditions in mind. It is an attempt to recapture
a "lost grand" tradition that motivates their search. For Alasdair
MacIntyre and Charles Taylor, for example, it is the Catholic tradition."o For Robert Bellah and his colleagues,"' it is the liberal
Protestantism of an earlier America.
local
implied
by
and
parochialism
insularity
The
communitarianism, and the totalizing tendency of national
communitarianism, are of serious concern to those who have lived
on the margin of political and social life. For them, the prevalence of terms like "solidarity," "communion," "tradition," and the
like, might not be a source of reassurance, but rather, cause for
apprehension.12 Those on the margin, such as ethnic minorities,
80 To be precise, the figure that looms large in the works of these two authors are
St. Thomas Aquinas in MacIntyre's work and St. Augustine in the work of Taylor. See
MAcINTYRE, supra note 68; CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE

MODERN IDENTITY (1989).
81

ROBERT NOELLY BELLAH, ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND THE

CoMMITTMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
82

In

the legal domain, leading theorists are turning to the concept of community
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do not clearly see themselves as part of the "we" the national
communitarians embrace.' Nor are they any more secure with
the possibility of numerous insular and exclusionary communities
proliferating at the local level.
In sum, communitarianism does not offer very much hope for
minorities. It is assimilationist in its nationalist dimension, and
exclusionist in its localist version. For minorities, -these are not
attractive alternatives. Indeed, the historical sentiments and the renewed interest in traditions that seem to define current
communitarianism are precisely the sort of conditions that have
historically led to the devaluation of the lives of minorities. By
devaluation, I mean that minorities are either excluded as being
different (i.e. unequal), or they are admitted to play roles (and to
accept identities) that they did not endorse or shape. 4 Retrieving

in the belief that political and legal legitimacy are to be found in the concept of community and its attendant obligations. Ronald Dworkin, in his recent book, LAW'S EMPIRE,
declared:
[T]he best defense of political legitimacy . . . is to be found not in the hard
terrain of contracts or duties of justice or obligations of fair policy that might
hold among strangers, where philosophers have hoped to find it, but in the
more fertile ground of fraternity, community, and their attendant obligations.
RONALD DWORmIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 206 (1986). It is not only leading liberal legal theorists,
but their radical critics as well who have embraced the notion of community as being a
more secure foundation for the law and social arrangements in general. Some members
of the Critical Legal Studies Movement have argued for some form of decentralized social arrangements in the belief that such arrangements are likely to cultivate and nurture
solidarity and community. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1057 (1980); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and
Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1986).
This recent emphasis on community has been greeted with uneasiness among minority scholars. The concern is not because these scholars are less committed to the
ideal of community than their counterparts. On the contrary, many of these people
would undoubtedly consider themselves as being very much linked to, and even strongly
defined by, the various communities to which they belong. The concern is informed by
the history of this and other countries where in the name of community and solidarity
certain people were (and still are) marginalized and excluded from participation in the
political and. social life of the polity. That exclusion and marginalization, in turn, justified
the challenge to their very humanity. See Delgado, supra note 79; Williams, supra note
79.
83 The communitarians simply assume that there is a "we" and do not inquire into
the nature of this "we." See Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1710-11 (1990). The communitarians attempt to "cure" the society of
multiple (and at times contradictory) traditions by assuming a coherent tradition.
84 To be a human agent partly requires that the agent endorses the components of
its life as being the ones that constitute the good life. And that endorsement would be
genuine only if the condition exists for the agent "to consider the critical merits [of the
components] in a reflective way." Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV.
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and strengthening such traditions and sentiments will not empower minorities. It will continue to do exactly the opposite-marginalize them.
Also unattractive about the communitarian conception of
groups (communities) is that it conceives of groups in essentialist
ways. Consequently, it sees differences among groups as given,
rather than seeing them for what they are: relational constructions. As I will argue in the next section, the best way to think of
groups is, unlike'the individualist, to acknowledge their important
and pervasive role in our lives, and, unlike the communitarian
(and with the postmodernist), to acknowledge their instability and
transformability. 5
CRITICAL PLURALISM AND ETHNIC RIGHTS:

IV.

GROUPS AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE

A.

6

Introduction: What is CriticalPluralism?

We want equality without its compeling to accept identity, but
also difference without its degenerating into superiority/inferiority.
-Tzvetan

Todorov8

7

If one rejects the individualist model and its institutional
manifestation, assimilation, and if one is not comfortable with the
communitarian argument both in terms of its unitary tradition
(and its institutional implication, which is assimilation by other
means) or parochial multiplicity, what alternative forms of argument exist for establishing and defending the cultural rights of
ethnic minorities?
I shall argue that the perspective I have chosen to refer to as
"critical pluralism" might provide us a better way of talking about

479, 486 (1989).
85 "We need to conceptualize groups in a 'post-modern' way, recognizing their reality in our lives without losing sight of the partial, unstable, contradictory character of
group existence." Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal

Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705.
86 "We have paid a high enough price for the nostalgia of the whole and the one,
for the reconciliation of the concept and the sensible, of the transparent and the coinmunicable experience ....
Let us wage war on totality; let us be witnesses to the
unrepresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the name."
LYOTARD, supra note 9, at 81-82.
87

TZVETAN TODOROV, THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA:

249 (Richard Howard trans. 1985).
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the rights of ethnic minorities. Against individualism, critical pluralism would argue that groups can be units of our moral concern
and that the provision of individual rights in the form of human
rights is an insufficient way of insuring full participation of ethnic
minorities in the life of the polity.
Contrary to the dominant trend of communitarianism, critical
pluralism argues against what Jean-Francois Lyotard calls the "great
story,"' the grand narratives within which all of us are supposed
to find ourselves and through which each one of us is to be inscribed. It argues that both descriptively and normatively it is better to think of societies as contests of narratives, "struggle[s] for
the privilege of recounting the past." 9 Unlike paternalistic pluralism, which defines ethnic minorities as the "Other," critical pluralism starts with the proposition that the right of ethnic minorities
is not merely one to be preserved from the cultural threat of the
majority, but also to have the institutional capacity to interrogate
the majority. Let me make my point clear. I am not arguing that
whatever control groups like Native Americans have achieved in
terms of running their affairs amounts to nothing. On the contrary, Native Americans and other indigenous groups have fought
long and hard even to get (cultural breathing space, and such
control would be essential for the group's capacity to narrate its
story. My point simply is this: in so far as the local narratives of
indigenous peoples are surrounded by the narrative of the dominant tradition, explicitly or implicitly validating those local narratives without itself being a point of reflection, then the right of
the group will have been a very limited one.
Critical pluralism is pluralist in the sense that its objective is
to provide the necessary resources and institutional structures for
the cultures of the minorities to flourish. It believes in multiplicity.
In its vision, the good society does not eliminate (or transcend)
group differences. On the other hand, unlike paternalistic pluralism, where multiplicity is accompanied by the attitude of the Other, critical pluralism sees society as a constant and desirable mutual interrogation of various narratives. As such, critical pluralism is
concerned not only with providing resources for minorities so as
to enable them to maintain and develop their culture; to produce
and tell their stories, but it seeks also to develop institutional

88 Supra note 9.
89 David Luban, Difference Made Lega
(1989).

Tie Court and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2152
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structures that will enable the minority cultures to engage the
dominant culture in a dialogue. Some might refer to critical pluralism as dialogic pluralism.
Why is institutional dialogue an important aspect of critical
pluralism? First, if it is true, as I have argued it is, that groups are
contingent rather than essential, and that their very meaning can
be rearranged and recast, then dialogic engagement becomes the
means by which this recasting takes place. Second, it is through
the process of dialogue, where different cultural groups are recognized as dialogue partners rather than as either negations or imitations of the dominant groups, that dominant groups might cease
to see their norms as neutral and universal. When the traditions
of ethnic groups are positively affirmed, the dominant group will
slowly discover its own specificity. This feeling of specificity is the
most important condition for the respect and celebration of difference. When, for example, African Americans' culture is positively
affirmed, European Americans will realize that their cultures and
attributes are not neutrally American and universal, but specific,
that is, European.
Third, institutional dialogue among cultural groups will serve
the same function Roberto Unger saw being served when theoretical insights are considered along with their institutional realizations: there will be necessary mutual correction."0 Dialogue
among cultural groups is likely to lead to mutually corrective engagement.9' In some sense, the point I am making here is very
similar to the contingency argument I made earlier. The process
of mutual correction might be understood to be the recasting and
reconceptualizing of groups, a process that is the result of the
contingency of groups.

90 For Unger's view of the value of a discourse which allows the institutions and ideals of a society to interrogate and mutually correct each other, see ROBERTO UNGER,
FALSE NECESSITIEs: ANTI-NECESSrrARAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY, POLITICS: A WORK IN CONSTRUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY 355-395

(1987). The value of

such a project is that the institutions of a society are examined in the light of the ideals
of the society, while the ideals themselves get revised as a result of the institutional experience of their (attempted) realizations.
91 Some might refer to this as the "mirror theory." The mirror theory says that one
cannot fully understand oneself unless one sees oneself through others. Antonio Faundez
puts it this way: "[I]n order to discover ourselves, we need to see ourselves in the other,
to understand the other in order to understand ourselves, to enter into the other." PAULO FREIRE & ANTONIO FAUNDEZ, LEARNING TO QUESTION: A PEDAGOGY OF LIBERATION 14
(1989). See also MARGARET MEAD & RHODA METRAUX, THE STUDY OF CULTURE AT A DISTANCE 18-22 (1953).

COMMUNITARIANISM AND ETHNIC MINORITIES

1991]

Fourth, it is in the process of dialogue, where social groups
attempt to accommodate in their "own normative world the objective reality of the other,"9 2 that the dominant group will come to
understand how it feels to be oppressed and excluded.
To summarize, critical pluralism is pluralist in the sense that
it acknowledges and celebrates the role of social groups in our
lives. It does not see the goodsociety to be one where group differences are transcended. It is critical (as opposed to complacent)
because it seeks to provide institutional structures that will force
the dominant group to open itself up for interrogation by those
that are regarded as the Other. Critical pluralism is a pluralism of
groups which argues that it is through the process of positively
reinforcing marginalized groups that we establish the condition
necessary for dialogue: the dominant group seeing its own specific-

ity.
B.

CriticalPluralism and the Concept of Group

To argue that critical pluralism takes the plurality of groups
seriously and does not view the good society to be the elimination
of groups still does not answer the
(or transcendence)
individualist's claim that the notion of group is a "metaphysical
nonsense."
The individualist's claim that ethnic rights are to be understood as a short hand for individual rights is, as I have noted earlier, a result of the suspicion on the side of the individualist that
it is conceptually possible to think of groups as being capable of
having an existence other than as a framework within which individuals are aggregated. If one cannot conceive of a group other
than in terms of its various constituent parts, then of course one

92 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court Term, 1982-Foreward: Nomos and Narrative 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 28-29 (1983) cited in Joseph William Singer, Property and Coercion in
Federal Indian Law: The Conflict Between Critical and Complacent Pragmatism, 63 S. CAL. L.

REV. 1821, 1837 (1990). Professor Singer cites a story from Tony Hillernian's novel, TALKING GOD, which makes the point well. In the novel, some American Indians, upset by the
display of the skeleton of their ancestors in nmuseums, demanded that those museums
stop displaying the skeletons and that they should return them for burial. The museums

refused to comply with the demand of the Indians. After the refusal, "the public relations director of the Smithsonian finds a parcel on her desk. She opens it up and finds
two human skeletons inside." The letter accompanying -them reads: "You won't bury the
bones of our ancestors because you say the public has the right to expect authenticity in
the museum when it comes to look at skeletons." When the director looks at the names
of the persons to whom the skeletons belonged she finds that they were her grandparents. Id. at 1837..
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cannot even begin to think and talk about the notion of group
rights. If the rights of groups are translatable into the rights of
the constituent parts of the group, then the individualist is right
that the notion of group rights is both conceptually incoherent
and unnecessary. But is the individualist correct? I shall argue in
this section that the individualist is wrong and that there are some
rights which can only be understood as group rights and are not
translatable into individual rights. I shall also suggest that the
notion of ethnic rights makes sense only if it is understood as a
moral right attached to a group.
Let me first make the point that the individualist might, in
fact, recognize group rights more than he thinks he does. Take,
for example, secession, an issue I dealt with earlier. If the individualist supports secession as one institutional manifestation of
ethnic rights, as many committed individualists do, then his support is informed not by the rights of individuals, but by the right
of the group. Presumably, even if there are some individuals who
do not support the idea of seceding from the larger political unit,
the individualist will feel justified in supporting the wish of the
majority to establish itself as a new political unit.
Of course, a utilitarian argument can be made that even in
relation to secession, what is being considered is individual interests and rights, and that when one supports secession one is merely responding to the greater number of individual interests and
choices. This utilitarian argument is unavailable to the individualist, for utilitarian calculus that sacrifices the interests of certain
individuals is the very thing against which the individualist traditionally defined his position. As Ronald Dworkin has argued, individual rights are
"trump cards" against the pursuit of a collective,
93
utilitarian goal.

In any case, on the conceptual level, the individualist's claim
that there can never be circumstances in which the appropriate
unit of agency is the community (or the group) to which the individual belongs seems to be incorrect. There are circumstances in
which simple aggregation of the activities and functions of individual members will not tell us the whole story about the community
or the group to which the individuals belong.
If the individualist is right, the concept of social injustice, for
example, could easily be understood in terms of individual injus-
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tice. That does not seem right. Take, for example, a situation
Robert Paul Wolff considers in his discussion of social injustice.
Suppose a black man who has all the necessary qualifications for a
particular job is denied that job simply because he is black. Further, assume that a white man, who was interviewed immediately
after the black man, and who is less qualified, is hired for the job.
We may rightly say that an injustice has been done to this particular black individual, for we might conclude that the color of one's
skin is not relevant to how one p1erforms the task required by this
particular job. Suppose there was another open position in the
same company. Suppose also that a qualified white candidate was
turned down for the position simply because the interviewer did
not like the interviewee's father, who happens to be a member of
the same social club of which the interviewer is also a member. In
this circumstance, we might also say that an injustice has been
inflicted on the rejected white candidate.
But are the two situations really the same? Are they both
about individual injustice? I think Wolff'is right in making the
observation that to treat both instances as cases of individual injustice is to misunderstand the nature of the rejection of the black
candidate.
The black man . . .is denied [the job] solely because he pos-

sesses a certain characteristic which [the interviewer] thinks of
as defining a social group. In that sense, the motive for the unjust act
is general rather than particular, and the injustice is visited on the
victim qua instance of a type rather than qua individual. [The interviewer] is not rejecting this black man; he is rejecting a black
94
man.

The interviewer makes no distinction between one black man and
another black man; his rejection of the particular black man is a
rejection of all black men (and perhaps all black people). The
injustice that he has inflicted is "on blacks as a group, rather than
merely on a group of blacks." ' The injustice and hurt inflicted is
indivisibly on blacks as a people. In such circumstances, one could
logically talk about group rights, for the existence of group injustice must imply the possibility of collective rights and group duties.

94 ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, The Concept of Social Injustice, ifiFROM CONTRACT TO COMMUNITY. PoLrIcAL THEORY AT THE CROSSROADS 65, 74 (Fred R. Dallmayer ed. 1978).
95 Id.
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Now, the individualist might accept the concept of social
injustice, but might argue, in her consequentialist moments, that
although social injustice cannot be understood as a collection of
many individual injustices, and although one might have to think
in terms of groups and the injustice to a group, this
characterization applies only for strategic and temporary reasons.
That is, the individualist might concede the conceptual coherence
of the notion of groups and even its utility, but only because of
the strategic relevance of thinking that way, rather than the intrinsic value of thinking in terms of groups.
I think the individualist project, even in this revised form, is
unsatisfactory if it is meant to be a global claim. There are other
circumstances one can cite to show that giving an account of individual activities and interests does not fully capture the activity and
interests of the collective.
Consider, for instance, the example Ronald Dworkin gives to
highlight the importance of community as a point of departure,
the orchestra. Individual members of an orchestra are
exhilarated, in the way personal triumph exhilarates, not by the
quality or brilliance of their individual contributions, but by the
performance of the orchestra as a whole. It is the orchestra
that succeeds or fails, and the success or failure of that
com6
munity is the success or failure of each of its members.
In Dworkin's example, one could legitimately talk about the
group, the orchestra, being a unit of agency. To say that the community or the group is the unit of agency is to make the claim
that the lives of the members of the group or of the community
"are bound up in their communal life, and that there can be no
private accounting of the critical success or failure of their individual lives one by one. ' 17 Accordingly, one cannot understand the
success of the enterprise in terms of the statistical summary of the
success or failure of individual members.
If groups can be units of agency, then they can be units of
our moral concern in the same way individuals are or can be.
Groups as units of agency can be treated justly or unjustly; conversely, they can treat others justly or unjustly. Since rights are
conferred, and duties imposed, on individuals precisely for those
reasons, as the individualist is quick to remind us, it seems logical

96 Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 493 (1989).
97 Id. at 494.
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to insist .that once the capacity of groups to be units of agency is
admitted, then it must be accepted that it is not metaphysical
nonsense to talk about the rights of groups. Nevertheless, because
I have argued that groups have rights, I must not be understood
to assume that groups have unalterable identities to which a right
is attached. This position is at odds with the argument I have presented thus far: group identities are constructed relationally and,
as a result, they are contingent and unstable. I neither assume nor
make such a claim. Arguing that it is logical to conceptualize
moral rights to groups in the same way we conceptualize moral
rights to individuals, because in each case, what is decisively relevant is the notion of agency, does not purport to make any claim
about the stability of the agent in either circumstance. Indeed,
those that want to read such a claim into my argument do so
because of their own faulty assumptions. Because they assume that.
individual identity is stable, any analogy between groups and individuals must therefore assume a corresponding stability as to
group identity. But individual identities are not stable, nor are
they any less the result of relational or negotiated constructions
than are group identities. " Individual identities are formed in
the process of interacting with other individuals as group identities
are formed in the process of, interacting with other groups. An
identity so formed can never be stable.
Even if one is persuaded that groups have an existence apart
from the existence and life of their components, and even if one
is convinced that those groups could be said to have rights that
might not be easily translated into the rights of the constituent
parts, one will still have to argue persuasively as to why it might
be said that a particular group exists and that it should be treated
as a group, rather than as a sum of its various parts. In other
words, what constitutes an ethnic group?9

98 "[W]e are not born with a 'self,' but rather are composed of a welter of partial,
sometimes contradictory, or even antithetical 'selves.' A unified identity, if such can ever
exist, is a product of will, not a common destiny or natural birthright." Angela P. Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 584 (1990).
99 One might want to address the slippery-slope argument here. The argument is
that to recognize one group is to open the society up for the claim of other groups for
such recognition. There is no principled way to distinguish between an ethnic group and
an association, such as the National Rifle Association (NRA). There are many responses
to the above claim. First, it seems intuitively correct to say that there is a significant
moral and political difference between the NRA on one hand, and Blacks and Native
Americans on the other. Second, ethnic groups are multi-dimensional in that they affect
and constitute various dimensions of the life of the individual, while groups like the NRA
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In my introductory remarks I gave some examples of ethnic
groups. Those examples suggest a definition of "ethnic group."
Examples, however, are vulnerable to counter examples. Without a
rough agreement on a set of general criteria defining what constitutes an ethnic group, the dialogue about ethnic rights might in
fact be unhelpful cross-talking.
An ethnic group might be defined as a unit whose members
believe themselves to be bound by a common history and culture.
The cultural heritage might take various forms, from a common
language to a common religion or other rituals and social practices. Another defining feature of an ethnic group is that the self
perception of its members concerning the identity of the group is
shared by outsiders. That is, members of the group, as well as
outsiders, believe that a distinctively shared history, culture, and
tradition define the group in question 00

are "uni-dimensional," that is, they are organized on the basis of a single purpose. See
Frances Svensson, Liberal Democracy and Group Rights: The Legacy of Individualism and Its
Impact on American Indian Tibes, 27 POL. STUD. 421, 434-35 (1979). Third, ethnic groups
are partly defined by history, rather than simple choice of individuals (as is the case with
the NRA). Fourth, ethnic groups, unlike associations such as the NRA, are partly constituted and sustained as a result of outsiders' perception of the existence of the group.
It is not only their narrative, but also the narrative of others, that constitute and sustain
groups like ethnic minorities.
100 "For the identification of ethnic groups, what matters is the belief, held by their
members and by others, in a shared distinctive culture or tradition and community of
descent." M. G. Smith, Pluralism, Race and Ethnicity in Selected African Countries, in THEORIES OF RACE AND ETHNIc RELATIONS 193 (1986). See also Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRs 107, 148 (1976) ("Blacks [in the United
States] are viewed as a group; they view themselves as a group; their identity is in large
part determined by membership in the group; their social status is linked to the status of
the group; and much of our action, institutional and personal, is based on these perspectives.") Fiss goes on to fuly define "group" in the following way:
[A] social group is more than a collection of individuals, all of whom, to use a
polar example, happen to arrive at the same street corner at the same moment . . . . [It] has two other characteristics. (1) It is an entity . . . [having] a
distinct existence apart from its members, and . . . an identity. You can talk
about the group without reference to the particular individuals who happen to
be its members at any moment. (2) There is also a coidition of interdependence.
The identity and well-being of the members of the group and the identity-well-being of the group are-linked. Members of the group identify themselves -- explain who they are-by reference to their membership in the group;
and their well-being or status is in part determined by the well-being or status
of the group.
Id.
There is also a useful discussion of the concept of social groups in YOUNG note 1,
at 42-48.
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Now, to define ethnic groups this way is to acknowledge simultaneously the reality of social groups, their importance in our
lives, as well as the fact that they are products of social relations.
Social groups constitute themselves (or are constituted by others)
in relation to other groups. Group identities are constructed by
interaction among groups.
Of course, not all ethnic minorities need our attention, nor
do they require special institutional "protection". Ethnic groups
that are numerically in the majority in a given polity, and that
have control of or have access to power will protect themselves by
virtue of the fact that they exercise power. So, our concern must
focus on the ethnic groups that can be considered minorities. I
will take the term "minority" to refer to a group "which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a [s]tate"01 l and is
in a subordinated position in the polity. 0 2 "Ethnic minority" will,
therefore, refer to a group that is numerically smaller than other
groups, especially the dominant group, such that it cannot have
access to effective power through the procedural means of statistical democracy or the market, and whose members perceive them-

101 Francesco Capotorti, the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, defined a minority group in a 1977 study
as follows:
[A minority] is a group which is numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State and in a non-dominant position, whose members possess ethnic,
religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the
population and who, if only implicitly maintain a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.
CAPOTORTI, supra note 60, at 1.
It is often the case that some groups do not see themselves as a group prior to
their encounter with the dominant and dominating group. For example, American Indians probably never saw themselves as such until their encounter with colonizing Europeans. But that does not in any way reduce the significance of their group status now. Part
of what constitutes a group is a shared memory of common suffering.
102 By introducing the notion of subordination I mean to make it impermissible to
apply the notion of ethnic rights to a numerically inferior group which is or has been in
a dominating position in a given polity. I mean to deny a small but powerful group to
continue to entrench itself in power by invoking the notion of group rights. Specifically,
I have South African whites in mind. One of the ironies of recent times is that in South
Africa it is de Klerk and the whites who have embraced the notion of group rights,
while Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress are adamant that the concept
of group rights will not have any place in the new South Africa. The New Republic quotes
Mandela as having said that de Klerk must "abandon the concept of group rights . . .
without any reservation." The magazine also refers to a speech by de Klerk where he is
quoted as having said that what South Africa needs is a "multiracial" society that avoids
"simplistic majority rule on the basis of one man, one vote." Michael Kinsley, Minority
Rules; TRB-South Africa, THE NEW REPUBUC, May 28, 1990, at p. 4 .
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selves, and are perceived by others, to be tied to each other by a
common history and cultural heritage.
C.

Cultural Right as Group Right

Even if you are convinced that critical pluralism is desirable,
that the notion of group is not metaphysical nonsense, and that
you know what an ethnic group is, you might still be skeptical
about the value of cultural rights.
A cultural right is a group right, for by its very nature, culture
is a communion of its members rather than the sum of the attitudes and life-projects of the various individuals within the group.
Just as one would not understand the orchestra, its success and its
failure, in terms of the success and failure of individual members,
so one would not understand culture in terms of the attitudes of
the individual members. The argument for cultural rights cannot,
therefore, be understood in terms of individual rights. It is within
groups that constitutive narratives (cultures) are produced and
through groups that sense is made of the social world. As Fred
Jameson put it: "the telling of the individual story and the individual experience cannot but ultimately involve the whole laborious
telling of the collectivity itself."103 Note that the claim here is
not that the individual story is identical to the story of the
collectivity, and that the story of each individual member is identical with the story of other members of the group. Rather, the
claim is that the story of the collectivity sets the range of options
within which the story or choice of the individual member will be
meaningful and will have significance.
So, when we say that ethnic minorities have a right to their
culture, we mean that the group has a moral right to have the
condition and the framework necessary for making choices. Culture provides the framework, the anchor, within which a range of
choices and values can be considered and evaluated.
Once one sees the protection and sustenance of minority
cultures as a right, then the argument sometimes offered as justification for the protection of minority cultures might be misplaced.
One sometimes hears political leaders and intellectuals (usually liberals from dominant groups) attempting to ground this right of
groups in what they see to be the value of such protection for the

103

FREDERIC JAMESON, THIRD WORLD LITERATURE IN THE ERA OF MULTINATIONAL CAP-

rrALISM, SOCIAL TEXT (Fall, 1986) cited in HOMI K. BHABHA, Dissemination: Time, Narrative,
and the Margins of the Modern Nation, in NATION AND NARRATION 292 (1990).
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entire polity, for oppressed as well as oppressor. I have no quarrel
with the idea of setting out as many benefits and reasons for protecting minority cultures as possible. In fact, I myself will do that
later in this Article. Nevertheless, those reasons can only be additions to, rather than conditions for, recognizing the right. If it is a
right of a group, then the utilitarian view. of whether or not it
benefits all of us cannot be allowed to determine its acceptability.
A right exists not because of, but regardless of, its utilitarian
impact.'0
If culture is an important framework within which groups
make choices and through which those choices are given significance, why shouldn't that simply mean that all cultural groups
should be given the same amount of resources to develop and
maintain their cultures? Presumably, all cultures are similarly important to their members. Put simply, why should there be a special and affirmative intervention by the state to help minorities
maintain and develop their cultures? The answer is clear, and in
many ways I have already suggested it. Minority cultures need
affirmative support because of the unequal circumstances that
define their relationship with dominant cultures. As Kymlicka has
argued, minority cultures are "vulnerable to the decision of
the ...

majority around them.""' The majority is not subject to

such vulnerability. That being the case, the right cannot be exhausted by simply equalizing the circumstances of individual members of minority cultures with those of members of the dominant
cultures.
And since [the] inequality [between dominant and minority
cultures] would remain even if individual members of [minority] communities no longer suffered from any deprivation of
material resources, temporary affirmative action programmes
are not sufficient to ensure genuine equality [among cultures].
Collective rights may be needed.'0 6
International law, as I argued earlier, does not explicitly provide for a group right to culture. Whenever there is a right to culture, it is expressed, as in article 27 of the Covenant, in individualist terms-the right to belong to culture. However, the interna-

104 "Special rights are justified because aboriginal people have a legitimate claim to
the protection of their cultural membership, whether or not the Lives of non-aboriginal
Canadians are thereby improved or enriched." KYMLICKA, supra note 75, at 191.
105 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism Connunity and Culture 187 (1989).
106 Id.at 190.
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tional community is not totally silent on the subject. Thus, article
19 of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples (the Algiers Declaration) provides for a minority's right to cultural identity.117 In addition, one could argue that the references to the
rights of peoples to their cultural developments one finds in article 22(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
or in article 1(2) of the UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of
International Cultural Cooperation, or in article 13 of the Algiers
Declaration, support the protection and support of cultural minorities.1°8

Of course, it is not quite clear that the word "peoples" in the
above documents refers to anything other than the entire inhabitants of the nation state. If it is meant to refer to the entire political community, then the right is nothing more than a right of
one political community against another political community. Read
this way, the formulation can be seen merely as a rejection of the
traditional understanding of colonialism on the cultural level. 9
It could, however, be argued that since the term "peoples," in
its ordinary usage, is also used to refer to groups other than a
political community, like indigenous communities, there does not
seem to be a good reason why a cultural right to a people could
not 0also be taken to mean a cultural right to an ethnic minori11
ty.

107 Universal Declaration on the Rights of Peoples, Algiers, July 4, 1976, reprinted in
RICHARD A. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 225 (1981).
108 Article I of the UNESCO Declaration provides that "[e]very people has the right
and the duty to develop its culture." UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, Nov. 4, 1966, rerinted in EDWARD H. LAWSON, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1501-02 (1991).
Article 22(1) of the African Charter provides that "[a]ll peoples shall have the right
to their economic, social and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and
identity." African Charter, supra note 58.
109 In another work, I have argued that the intense debate which took place during
the early part of the 1980s between the Third World and developed countries under the
banner of "the new world information order" can be understood as the third stage of
self-determination, which is cultural decolonization. The first two stages were political
decolonization and economic decolonization. The former described the formal independence process, while the latter is best exemplified by the United Nation's attempt to
restructure the control and appropriation of international economic power. The name
given to the attempt at such structuring is the "New International Economic Order"
(NIEO). See Adeno Addis, The New World Information and Communication Order: The
Attempt to Restructure the International Communication Process (1987) (Unpublished
J.S.D. thesis). So, the cultural rights of peoples in the above instruments might plausibly
be seen as being another normative statement to emphasize the importance of cultural
self-determination if political communities are to be genuinely independent.
110 In any case, Professor James Crawford seems to be right when he observes that
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In any case, it seems perverse to say that while cultural
self-determination is important and is subject to a theory of justice
when the domination is perceived to come from outside the political community, it is of no concern to a theory of justice when the
domination comes from inside the political community. The fact
that international law and international political theory have not
taken the cultural rights of minorities seriously does not justify
further neglect.
V. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
TAKING CRITICAL PLURALISM SERIOUSLY

The required institutional response will necessarily vary according to the nature and history of a given ethnic minority and
the larger social context within which the particular minority is
making the claim. Nevertheless, there are two institutional implications of critical pluralism as it applies to cultural rights 6f ethnic
minorities. First, critical pluralism requires that ethnic minorities
be provided with the resources that will enable them to affirm and
nurture their cultures, and hence to affirm themselves. Second,
critical pluralism requires that there be institutional means which
would enable the minority to engage the majority in a dialogue.
The first is a necessary condition for the second, and the second
requirement is what distinguishes critical pluralism from paternalistic pluralism.
A.

Ethnic Minorities and Resource Allocation

A group must have certain resources before it can affirm itself
as a group. Specifically, the conditions which lead to the group
being outbid and outvoted in relation to the resources necessary
for sustaining the culture must be removed. Quite often this requires that the government take special measures to provide those
resources.
The resources needed for the affirmation' and nurturing of
cultures will vary from group to group. This is because cultures
and communities arrange themselves differently and hence the
resources crucial for the survival of one culture might not be
centrally constitutive in relation to another. For example, land

even in its usage in international documents, the term "people" "is context dependent."
JAMES-CRAWFORD, The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 159,
169 (1988).
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rights are essential to the survival and integrity of the culture of
indigenous peoples, while land rights might be less crucial for the
survival of the cultures of other people.
1. Land Rights
Why is access to and control of land important for the stability and survival of the cultures of indigenous peoples? First, as a
U.N. Report put it:
It is essential to know and understand the deeply spiritual and
special relationship between indigenous peoples and their land
as basic to their existence as such and to all their beliefs, customs, traditions and culture. For such peoples, the land is not

merely a means of production. The entire relationship between
the spiritual life of indigenous peoples and Mother Earth, and
their land, has a great many deep-seated implications. Their
land is not a commodity to be acquired, but a material ele-

ment to be enjoyed freely."'
Indigenous peoples see themselves as trustees of the land. Dispossession is therefore not simply dispossession of the physical land,
but the destabilization of their very identity, which to a large extent develops through their relationship to the land." 2 Second,
physical space is necessary for them to be able to conduct cultural
activities such as fishing and hunting. Cultural self-determination
is, in this sense, strongly tied to the control of, and access to, a
physical space. Third, the protection of sacred sites requires that
there is access to and control of such land. Unless there is such
control, history teaches that there is going to be great pressure on
economic units and regimes of the larger political unit to sacrifice
those sites for short term economic benefits." 3
Put simply, for many indigenous peoples, land gives coherence to their culture1 4 and provides shelter from the colonizing

Ill
U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Study of the Problem of DiscriminationAgainst Indigenous Population, at
para. 196-97, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add. 4(16) (1986).
112 Id.
113 I have in mind something like mineral mining.
114 "The idea was expressed [in the third session of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations] by all the observers from indigenous populations who attended the
ineeting, that the preservation of the life and cultures of indigenous populations was
indissolubly linked to their lands and natural resources." U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discriminationand Protection of Minorities: Study of the
Problem of DiscriminationAgainst Indigenous Population, Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on Its Third Session, at 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/20 (1984).
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and disintegrative effects of the dominant culture. The right to
land reduces the capacity of the dominant group to outbid and
outvote the minority in terms of the resources necessary to develop the latter's culture. Of course, an initial right to land will not
be sufficient to reduce the possibility of indigenous peoples being
outbid and outvoted. As Kymlicka has argued, if non-indigenous
people are allowed to move into the community, to buy land from
the indigenous people, and to vote on matters that affect the
community, then sooner or later the non-indigenous, because of
their sheer number and greater resources, will have outvoted and
outbid the indigenous people on many of the issues crucial to the
latter's cultural survival. 1 5
Given the above, what does land right mean? It means, at the
minimum, recognizing the group's communal right to land, consequently restricting individual alienation of native land. Otherwise,
individual alienation of land will seriously undermine the whole
notion of an indigenous right to land. It also means that aboriginal landholders would be wholly responsible for the way in which
their resources are used. Barring. this, outsiders will have the numbers and the resources to determine the culture's fate.
Now, the questions of exit and re-entry also arise here. The
issue of exit is relatively easy. If an individual does not want to
remain a member of a tribe, for example, he or she should be
free to move out. However, in most cases a "cultural exit" will be
much more difficult than the physical exit. If nothing else, outsiders will likely remind (through attitude, actions or otherwise) the
exiter of his or her heritage.
The issue of re-entry is a much more difficult one. Suppose a
tribe member took steps which, according to the tribe's tradition,
indicated an exit (for example, marrying a non-indigenous person). Suppose also that the particular individual terminated the
act that led to the exit (for example, divorced the spouse) and
consequently wanted to rejoin tribal life. Consider that there is a
tribal prohibition of re-entry of people who took steps such as the
ones taken by the individual in this case. The question is, should
the final decision rest in the hands of the tribe, or does the larger
political unit have a say in the decision? What if'the refusal to readmit is inconsistent with another principle of the larger political
unit?

115
116

6

KymucKA, supra note 75, at 197-98.
See The Lovelace Casa Report of the Human Rights Committee, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp.
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One of the most important rights a minority group will have
is the right to establish membership rules. If the majority decides
(through its legislature or other bodies) the criteria for membership in the minority culture, then, for all practical purposes, the
script for destroying the cultural identity of these minority cultures
has been written. What the majority will see as peripheral to the
cultural survival of a minority might in fact be seen to be an important cultural symbol by the minority. In any case, it seems
rather odd that the very groups (dominant majorities) that did a
great deal of the damage to the cultures of these minorities will
be given the ultimate power to decide what is important and what
is marginal in these cultures. Has not the problem been that dominant groups have tended to see minorities and their cultures as
being, on the whole, peripheral?
The argument here is not that all aspects of minority cultures
are attractive or desirable. Indeed, there might be some aspects of
those cultures which will clearly strike an outsider as being very
undesirable. My contention here is simply that in most cases when
the majority has had the power to decide the criteria for membership, it has seriously destabilized the cultures of those groups. And
indeed, many of the undesirable features of those cultures developed as a reaction to the dominant group's coercive interventions,
rather than because of a lack of such interventions. Moreover, in
many cases the supposedly unattractive feature of the minority
culture might look that way because outsiders tend to see it in
isolation, rather than in relation to other aspects of the culture
which might function to correct it. Finally, cultures do change as a
result of either internal challenge or interrogation by other cul-

(No. 40) at 166, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (1981). This was a case where a registered Maliseet
Indian lost her right and status as an Indian after marrying a non-Indian. She lost her
status because a Canadian statute, the Indian Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. I-b, § 12(1)(b)
(1970), provided that an Indian woman who marries a non-Indian man loses her status.
An Indian man who marries a non-Indian woman, however, would not lose his status.
When Sandra Lovelace wanted to return to her tribe's reserve after her marriage ended,
she, of course, was not allowed to do so pursuant to the Act. Lovelace took her case to
the United Nations Human Rights Committee. The Committee ruled that the Act violated article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and that
Lovelace was entitled, as a member of an ethnic minority, to associate with that group
on the reserved land. Having determined that the Act violated article 27 of the Covenant, the Committee did not have to decide (or did not believe it had to decide) the
other ground on which Lovelace challenged the statute: the prohibition of gender discrimination contained in article 2 of the Convenant.
Section 12(1)(b) was repealed by an Act to Amend the Indian Act of 1985. The
new legislation repealed the gender specific restriction.
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tures. Indeed, the latter will be required by critical pluralism. Such
changes might be for the good, but the changes must be a result
of the volitional and reflective acts of those communities.
In the area of land rights, there have been'some steps in the
right direction,"' but these steps have been insufficient. In many
countries which contain indigenous populations, individual rights
is the language of discourse, and assimilation is the most favored
course of action.'
Perhaps the recent efforts of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Working
Group)" 9 will produce principles whose theme will be collective
(as opposed to individual) rights and whose central institutional
concern will be land rights (or territorial rights). 20 Given the
numerous stories it has heard from indigenous peoples from all
over the world since 1982, and the consistency of those stories
regarding the importance of land to the cultural survival of indigenous peoples, it is unlikely that the Working Group will go in any
other direction. Indeed, its Draft Universal Declaration 12 seems
to indicate that.1 22 The narratives of indigenous peoples are
gradually transforming the nature of international discourse about

117 In relation to Australian Aborigines, for example: "[I~n 1966 no Aboriginal Australian owned land by virtue of being Aboriginal. By January 1986, some 643,079 s4uare
kilometers, representing 8.37% of the Australian land mass, were held by Aboriginals in
freehold." Nettheim, supra note 76, at 293. For an interesting and very informative exploration of the historical and current contexts of the land rights movement in Australia,
see HENRY REYNOLDS, THE LAW OF THE LAND (1987).

118 "Indigenous rights in many countries are not even recognized in domestic law
and policy. Often times, states impose forced assimilation programs upon indigenous
peoples...." Williams, supra note 74, at 703. For an exploration of the status of indigenous peoples in a few selected countries, see Raidza Torres, TVe Rights of Indigenous Poptulations: The Emerging InternationalNorm, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 127 (1991).
119 The Working Group was set up in 1982 by the United Nations Economic and
Social Council (by Resolution 2(xxxiv)) as a forum devoted to the development of international legal standards. See Williams, supra note 74, at 666-685; see also Torres, supra note
118, at 170. The Working Group meets annually and its meetings are "attended regularly
by nearly four hundred persons, including representatives from over fifty indigenous organizations and observers from more than two dozen national governments." Williams, supra
note 74, at 677.
120 "National governments must realize that indigenous peoples would not accept a
declaration on indigenous rights that failed to include a strong statement on land rights."
Andrhe Lawrey, Contemporay Efforts to Guarantee Indigenous Rights Under International Law,
23 VAND. J. TRANSNATIONAL L. 703, 723 (1990).
121 Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33 (1989) [hereinafter Draft Universal Declaration].
122 The Draft Universal Declaration provides that indigenous peoples have a collective
right to the ownership, possession, and uses of their land. See id. at paras. 12-13.
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the needs and rights of indigenous peoples, showing the
importance of allowtransformative capacity of narratives and the
2
stories.
own
their
tell
to
ing the oppressed
2.

Language

The survival and flourishing of a group's culture also depends, in large part, on the vitality of its language. Language is
not a mere medium of a reality that is located outside it, but is
constitutive of that reality. It is not that there is culture and then
there is language through which the culture can be communicated. No, communication is not a secondhand activity. Our language, like our history, is the means through which we attach
meaning and give structure to our cultural activities. It is the process by which the significance of a particular activity and its relationship with other activities is made clear to us.1 24 In this sense,

to destroy the language of a group is to destroy its culture.
There is also another, pragmatic reason for protecting and
supporting the language of minorities. Perhaps it could be explained best with an example. The beginning of the tension between the Tamil minority and the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka,
a tension that developed into an outright war and brought destruction to the island, can be said to date back to 1956, when the
parliament of then Ceylon, by a simple majority, passed the Official Language Act making Sinhala, the language of the majority,
the only official language. The Tamil minority saw this as an assault on the very existence of its culture.12 5
As the Sri Lankan example suggests, it is not only the centrality of language to cultures and cultural developments that requires
us to take the languages of minorities seriously (although that is a
sufficient reason). The tragedy of Sri Lanka demonstrates that

123 See Williams, supra note 74, at 704 ("[The Working Group's draft] provides a powerful and empowering instance of the ways in which peoples of color, such as indigenous
peoples, through their own stories, can seek to transform legal thought and doctrine
about their human rights according to the terms of a different vision of justice in the
world.").
124
The processes by which options and choices become significant for us are linguistic and historical processes. Whether or not a course of action has significance for us depends on whether, or how, our language renders vivid to us the
point of that activity. And the way in which language renders vivid to us the
point of these activities is a matter of our culture heritage.
KymucKA, supra note 75, at 190.
125 Marasinghe, supra note 5, at 560-61.
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undermining minority languages leads not to stability and union,
as the advocates of linguistic conformity believe, but to conflict
and destruction.
Now, there are institutional and practical problems with recognizing the linguistic identities of all groups in a polity. It is, for
example, impractical, virtually impossible in most situations, to
recognize all languages in the polity as official languages. The
proposition of equal status for all languages is plausible if only two
or three languages are spoken in a nation.126 But when a nation
has dozens of languages, as does Ethiopia, 127 it is, to say the

least, rather impractical to think of according equal status to all
the languages that are spoken in that nation. Many countries,
especially developing countries, are defined not only multi-ethnically, but also multi-linguistically. And given those circumstances, it
is likely to be financially prohibitive and administratively chaotic to
give the languages of all groups an official status. So, how can the
notion of linguistic identity be given institutional meaning? This is
a very difficult question.
Some countries have dealt with the issue by giving official
status to selected minority languages. The criteria by which official
status is accorded some languages and not others is not always
clear. Some seem to select those languages which are spoken by
significant minorities. 12 The flaw in such a selection process is
that deciding what is a "significant" minority is a political, rather
than a mere mechanical, act. Indeed, in many circumstances the
notion of significance is likely to be equated not so much with

126 There are a number of countries which have made the languages of all ethnic
groups national or official languages. In Switzerland, for example, French, Italian, German, and Romanish, the four languages that are spoken in the country, have been declared national languages. Now, even though at the federal level the equality of the four
languages is recognized and affirmed, at the cantonal level their relationship is much
more complicated. See CAPOTORTI, supra note 60, at 76. In Belgium, the three linguistic
groups-Dutch, French, and German-have their languages recognized as official languages. 1d. Canada is a bilingual nation, with both English and French recognized as national
languages.
127 The number of languages in Ethiopia seems to vary from one observer to another. It is a commentary on the state of research on the country that there is not a definite number. The number seems to vary between forty and eighty, with the latest estimate being eighty. See Chazan, Destitute Ethiopia Gets a Chance to Rebuild, Agence France
Press, July, 9, 1991.
128 Finland, for example, gives official status to the language of the Swedish minority,
which constitutes about 6% of the population, while not according the same status to the
language of the Lapps, who are said to number about 4000. See Capotorti, supra note
60, at 76. Canada recognizes French, but no languages of the indigenous peoples.
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number, but, rather, with the amount of power a particular community possesses. In any case, it seems undesirable if the consequence of elevating some languages to an official status is the total
neglect of other minority languages. For it is those very minority
groups that would be outbid and outvoted in relation to the resources necessary for their language and culture to survive and
flourish that are going to need the specific intervention of the
state. The complaint here is not that some languages get equal
status with the language of the dominant group, but rather that
such action is accompanied by the total neglect of languages of
less powerful minorities.
Perhaps one way a language could be preserved might be by
allowing a minority community to have educational instruction in
its community conducted in its own language, at least for elementary schooling."t
Indeed, under the UNESCO Convention
Against Discrimination in Education, adopted in 1960, states party
to the Convention agree that it is important that minorities are
allowed to use and teach their own language.13 0 The need for a
national language to conduct certain national activities need not
require that all activities within the nation be conducted in that
language. Elementary educational instruction is one activity which
need not be conducted in one language. Indeed, in most developing countries where education is not widely diffused, it might be
that using the local community's language as the medium of in-

129 A number of countries have adopted a similar position. In Fiji, for example, pri-

mary educational instruction is in the languages of the various ethnic groups. In the case
of indigenous Fijians, the instruction is in Bauan, while the Indian children get their
education either in Hindustani or Urdu. See CAPOTORTI, supra note 60, at 86.

130 UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, opened for signature Dec.
14, 1961, 429 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force May 22, 1962).
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struction
is the 3 2most effective way"' of making education more
widely available.
B. Ethnic Minorities and InstitutionalDialogue
As I argued earlier, critical pluralism also requires that the
narratives of minorities are institutionally capable of engaging
those of the dominant group. Otherwise, the protection and support of the minority culture will be seen in a most devastatingly
paternalistic way by the dominant culture, and the growth and
influence of the minority culture will be diminished.3 3
What does institutional dialogue mear in practical terms?
There are a number of situations (perhaps an infinite number)
one could think of as examples of institutional dialogue between
the dominant and minority cultures. There are, however, two circumstances which explicitly address the issue of dialogue: one is
the educational experiefice, and the other is the role of the media. These two aspects of social life become very important in
relation to the possibility of cultural dialogue for two reasons.

131 I must point out here, however, that in some developing countries it might be
very difficult, at least initially, to do this for various reasons. A particular minority might
not have a written language; even if it does have one, the language might not possess
the vocabulary necessary to develop the appropriate curriculum. And until sufficient numbers of books are translated, there will obviously be a shortage of textbooks, as there will
also be a shortage of teachers until teachers are trained in the language. See UNESCO,
The Use of Vernacular Languages in Education, Monographs on FundamentalEduation, No. VIII
(1953) at 50-54, dted in CAPOTORTI, supra note 60, at 84. 1 believe, however, that most of
these problems could be solved over time. The fact that a minority's language is not a
written language does not mean that it is incapable of being one. And, as to the argument that some languages might not have the richness of vocabulary to be media of
instruction, it is true that some concepts in a curriculum, especially scientific concepts,
probably cannot be precisely described in many of the languages. But that is likely to be
the case with almost any language that must describe for the first time concepts that are
not (or have not been) part of the culture of the particular community. Over time,
however, the language will develop the appropriate vocabulary to describe those concepts.
132 Some countries have taken a slightly different approach from both the selective
recognition illustrated by the Finnish approach and from the quasi-decentralization I have
suggested. They recognize only one official language at the national level, while allowing
official status to minority languages at the regional level. Thus, for example, Austria has
one official language, German, at the national level, while it simultaneously allows languages of minorities to have the same status as the national language in the region in
which the particular minorities live. CAPOTORTI, supra note 60, at 76.
133 "It is the generally accepted view that to be effective a cultural policy must afford
a variety of opportunities for the wide dissemination of the culture concerned . . . . [A]
most important contribution is made today by radio and television." CAPOTORTI, supra
note 60, at 99.
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First, the media and the educational system have increasingly
become the cultural memory of groups and polities. What elders
and oral narratives perpetuated in an earlier era is now accomplished through the two institutions. Second, for various reasons,
some intentional, others structural, for many groups, the two avenues have become the only means of contact they have with each
other. As such, the two have become the most significant means
by which each group constructs the identity of the other (and,
ultimately, even its own identity). The absence of minorities in the
curriculum and the media, both in terms of narratives and narrators, means that the identities of minorities are being constructed
in their absence.
1.

The Media and Minorities
Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the
world, in order to name the world. Hence, dialogue cannot
occur between those who want to name the world and those
who do not wish this naming-those who deny other men the
right to speak their word and those whose right to speak has
been denied ....

Because dialogue is an encounter among

men who name the world, it must not be a situation where
some men name on behalf of others.
-Paulo Freire1M
If I'm not who you say I am, then you're not who you think
you are.
-James Baldwin'
One of the most effective ways through which dominant
groups inflict violence on minorities is through cognitive representation/misrepresentation/nonrepresentation of those groups. The
media play the most prominent role in this process. Given the
complexity of societies, social organizations, and technological
transformations, the media become the primary means through
which groups learn of each other, and thus the means by which
group identities are constantly constructed. The media, therefore,
possesses great potential to ensure that there is genuine interaction and dialogue among groups.

134 FREIRE, supra note 11, at 77.
135 Jannette L. Dates. & William Barlow, Introduction: A War of Images, in SPLIT IMAGE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE MASS MEDIA 5 (1990), citing James Baldwin, interviewed
on CBS News, October 1967.
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Nevertheless, in most cases, and in many countries, the media
have not served that purpose well. Indeed, in most instances the
identities of minorities are constructed in their absence. The media either systematically omit subjects that are of interest to minorities, or when minorities enter the discourse as subjects, they are
usually cast in the most unfavorable light." 6
The omission from the communication process of issues that
are important for minorities or the negative picture of minorities
that fill the mass media, quite often is accompanied by an almost
complete absence of minorities as communicators. 7
,Any concern about the rights of ethnic minorities and the
possibility of critical dialogue between minorities and majorities
will have to take the communication industry seriously and to provide for the condition of a fuller and a more accurate representa-

136 In a forthcoming article, entitled "Hell Man, Tlhy Did Invent Us:" Thw Mass Media,
Law and African-Americans, I show in some detail how the mostly white mass media in the
United States represents/misrepresents African-Americans. The media deals with Blacks in
two ways. On the one hand, the. media acts as if they do not exist. This is the case in
terms of social items and generally issues that are of interest to African-Americans. What
Ronald Walters, chairman of the political science department at Howard University, recently said about The Washington Post is true generally about the media in major urban
areas which have a majority, or a significant minority, Black population.
The Post leaves a lot to be desired. . . . It is almost as if there is no vibrant
black culture in the city [Washington D.C.]. It doesn't cover life at the community level. Washington, D.C., has the largest black middle class in the world, and
you would never know it from reading The Post.
Quoted in David E. Rosenbaum, An Editor Is Retiring Leaving His Mark, N.Y. Times, June
22, 1991, at 3, col. 1.
On the other hand, when African-Americans are of interest to the media it is to reinforce the stereotypical view of them. When it is not an image of African-Americans as
criminals, it is one of them 'as people who are not capable of thinking rationally, with
no ambition, without the capacity to lead, and with no sense of responsibility. My Article
explores the image of African Americans in three specific areas: African-American politicians, young African-American males, and African-American athletes.
137 In the United States, for example, minorities own and control only about three
percent of the broadcasting" stations although they constitute twenty percent of the population. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 110 S.Ct. 2997, 3033 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, views minority representation in
the electronic media in the last two decades in this way:
Although for the past two decades minorities have constituted at least one-fifth
of the United States population, during this time relatively few members of minority groups have held broadcast licenses. . . . [Iun 1978, minorities owned less
than 1 percent of the Nation's radio and television stations, . . . and in 1986,
they owned just 2.1 percent' [of the broadcast media].
Id. at 3003. In relation to the print media, the situation is even worse. A 1988 survey
concluded that "the majority of U.S. dailies still have no minority professional on their
staff." American Society of News Papers Editors, April 13, 1988, at 1.
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tion of the lives of minorities in the mass media. This means, at
least partially, developing programs that will enable members of
minority groups to enter the industry as owners and or communicators.
2.

The Curriculum and Minorities
[W] hen someone with the authority of a teacher, say, describes
the world and you are not in it, there is a moment of psychic
disequilibrium, as if you looked into a mirror and saw nothing.
-Adrienne Rich...

Another possible arena for critical dialogue between dominant
and minority groups is the curriculum, where the narratives of
minorities could engage the dominant narrative. Given the fact
that schooling is the most explicit form of cultural politics, it becomes important that the conditions for inclusive and interrogative
political action exist. In most countries, however, the general curriculum, from elementary to higher education, is defined by a set
of texts whose central organizing theme is the dominant tradition,
and from which the stories of those on the margin are conspicuously absent." 9 The curriculum makes minorities textually invisible. Quite often this textual invisibility reinforces and legitimizes
the physical and social exclusion of minorities from various areas
of social and political life. When a group's story is excluded from
the very domain in which knowledge is produced and legitimated,
this has not merely pedagogical consequences, but has profound

138 ADRIENNE RICH, BLOOD, BREAD, AND POETRY:
SELECTED PROSE 1979-1985 199
(1986).
139 Currently, in the United States, there is an intense debate about the curriculum.
Those who are challenging the canon, usually a coalition of postmodernists and minority
scholars and activists, argue that the curriculum in the United States is, by and large,
Euro-centric and must broaden itself to include traditions and cultures other than European culture(s) if it is to be relevant to a multi-cultural world. Those that resist these
challenges do not deny that the curriculum is centrally constituted by a western tradition,
but argue that the tradition is the best tradition and, therefore, see a challenge to it to
be a challenge to civilization itself. Indeed, the complaint is that the curriculum
already
has strayed too far from the great western tradition. Allan Bloom, the most well known
member of the "no-concession to the barbarians" crowd, argues that a good education, at
least in institutions of higher education, has only one route: . . . "the good old Great
Books approach, in which a liberal education means reading certain generally recognized
classic texts . . . . [W]herever the Great Books make up a central part of the curriculum, the students are excited and satisfied. . . ." ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE
AMERICAN MIND: How HIGHER EDUCATION HAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE
SOULS OF TODAY'S STUDENTS 344 (1987). There are numerous Booms in this and other
countries.
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political consequences as well. The institutions and social practices
which will be inscribed through this knowledge will not recognize
those very minorities whom the textual authority has excluded.
A curriculum that is faithful to critical pluralism is one which
includes the voices and stories of those who are marginalized
minorities. The inclusion is likely to accomplish four important
objectives. First, interrogation of the dominant culture by other
cultures might lead the dominant culture to see its own particularity and partiality, "the constructed nature of [its] own, historical
and social categories, " ' rather than continuing to see itself in
universal, neutral terms. It is only when one realizes one's specificity and partiality that one is likely to engage the other in a dialogue. When one sees one's way of doing things as neutral and
universal, one does not see the need for, or the value of, a dialogue.
Second, a diverse curriculum is likely to reveal how differences are constructed, that is, their historical and relational nature.
The possibility of reconstituting those differences depends on the
realization of their relational and contingent nature.
Third, in the classroom, faculty and students from minority
groups141 are more than likely to engage members of the dominant group when they feel and believe that they (and their experiences) are positively affirmed. The textual dialogue will make the
human dialogue more probable.

140 STANLEY ARONOWITZ & HENRY A. GIROUX, POSTMODERN EDUCATION: POLITICS, CULTURE AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 104 (1991).
141 An inclusive curriculum is inclusive not only in terms of the materials (texts) it
includes, but also in terms of the people it admits. For minorities to be able to engage
the majority in cultural terms requires not only that their stories be part of the curriculum, but that they be admitted as narrators of those stories, as teachers, and as students. The absence of minorities in the classroom will, more probably than not, lead to
the reification of minority narratives.
It also appears to me that the relationship between intellectuals (in the broadest
sense of the term) and narratives is a mutually constitutive one. Minority teachers and
students give context and life to the narratives of minority cultures, as those narratives
produce and reproduce the subjects that tell those stories. It is in this sense that people,
since Antonio Gramsci wrote his celebrated notes on intellectuals, have been arguing that
intellectuals occupy an important place in political life. They act as the memory of the
community, by simultaneously giving coherence to the ideologies (or stories as I have
elected to refer to them) through which a community produces and reproduces itself,
and by saving it from reification. See ANTONIO GRAMSCi, The Intellecuals, in SELECTIONS
FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Q. Hoare & G. Smith trans. and ed. 1971). See also
ARONOWITZ & GIRoux, supra note 140, at 151-55; Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist
Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L. J. 705.
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Fourth, when narratives from minorities are allowed institutionally to interrogate the dominant discourse, that will allow the
various minority groups to draw their solidarities "in the form of
similarities between modes of repression and modes of struggle
which all minorities separately experience, and experience precisely as minorities."" This will create the conditions "Within particular institutions that allow students to locate themselves and others
in histories that mobilize, rather than destroy, their hopes for the
43
future."1
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE VIRTUE OF INCOMPLETENESS'"

Incompleteness is a virtue ...
for it leaves room for local
self-determination and cultural diversity.
-Michael
Walzer'45
The institutional complexity of giving substance to what I have
daunting.
undoubtedly
will
be
called
critical
pluralism
Nevertheless, we have no choice but to embrace critical pluralism
and to attempt to give it institutional meaning. Otherwise, we will
either continue down the road of cultural negation, politely
termed assimilation, or we will continue to keep a semblance of
respect for groups, not by engaging them, but by defining them as
Others who are not capable of institutional engagement. Neither
course of action is the condition either for stability and social
peace or for social equality among groups (and consequently
among members of groups). Indeed, both will produce and reproduce social and political inequality, and, consequently, instability
and conflict.
We must abandon the false alternatives that currently seem to
define the relationship between dominant and oppressed ethnic
minorities: either members of ethnic minorities are seen to be, on
a deeper level, the same as members of the dominant group, or
minorities are seen to be so objectively and essentially different
from the majority that only separate existence (unequal treatment)
is seen to be the solution. Both have been tried and have had an

142 Lloyd, Introduction: Minority Discourse-What is to be Done? 7 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 5,
11 (1987) cited in ARONOWITZ & GIROUX, supra note 140, at 133.
143 Id.
144 The title is inspired by the title of Michael Walzer's review of Agnes Heller's
BEYOND JUSTICE. See Michael Walzer, The Virtue of Incompletion, 19 THEORY AND SOCIETY
225 (1990).
145 Id. at 225.
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enormously damaging exclusionary effect on minorities. The first
has given us assimilation, and the second segregation or total
negation.
Critical pluralism argues that those are not the only choices
available to us. Indeed, the only sensible route open to us is one
where group differences are acknowledged to be an important
aspect of social and political life, but where these very differences
are adjusted and reconstituted in a process of constant and genuine dialogue.
We must resist the modernist tendency (both in its individualist and communitarian dimensions) to complete and hence freeze
political and social stories and the institutions within which they
are narrated. In their different ways, both individualism and
communitarianism yearn for a totalizing account; they have the
itch, as Michael Walzer put it, "for singularity and unity, as if
these two might provide a relief from moral anxiety, an end to
striving, and therefore a kind of completion. "146 Individualism
does its totalizing and its completion through its image of the
universal individual, who has certain needs and rights. That individual inscribes every other individual. 47 For the communitarian,
the complete narrative is one that tells the story of a final harmonious union between the individual and the political community.
The abstract individual and the abstract community are invoked to
write a unitary and final story, to close the chapter, "to end the
endlessness of liberation," to avoid the political and moral anxiety
that seems to be implied by the role of groups in our lives and
their potential to destablize both our conceptual schemes and
political arrangements. But the anxiety about groups cannot be
dealt with by simple avoidance or denial. Only by living through it
8
will the anxiety ultimately diminish.14.

146 Id. at 226. Walzer makes a similar point in another article. He observes: "[m]uch
of liberal political theory, from Lock to Rawls, is an effort to fix and stabilize the doc-

trine [liberalism] in order to end the endlessness of. . . liberation." Michael Walzer, The
Conmunitarian Critique of Liberalism, 18 POLITICAL THEORY 6, 14 (1990).
As to communitarians, the tendency is to see the completed narrative to be one
which tells the story of a harmonious union between the individual and the community
within which the individual is located.
147 See JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
148

Terry Eagleton makes the following observation:

'Nationalism,' remarks an African character in Raymond Williams's novel Second
Generation, . . . 'is in this sense like class. To have it, and to feel it, is the only
way to end it. If you fail to claim it, or give it up too soon, you will merely be
cheated, by other classes and other nations.'
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We must simultaneously acknowledge the existence of group
perspectives, differences among those perspectives, and the
transformability of those perspectives where "the meaning of difference itself becomes a terrain of political struggle."' 4 This can
happen when the cultures and stories of those minorities are positively affirmed and can institutionally interrogate the dominant story. The task is to open up cultural communities without destroying
them, to resist the dominant culture's itch to complete the story,
indeed, to resist the notion of completeness itself. The notion of
cultural rights has, and must have, that objective.

Terry Eagleton, Nationalism: Irony and Comment, in SEAMUS DEAN, TERRY EAGLETON,
FREDERIC JAMESON & E. SAm, NATIONALiSM, COLONIALISM, AND LITERATURE 23 (1990). My
point here is not to imply that group differences, like Eagleton's class and nationalism,
would ultimately be banished if we only acknowledge their existence, go through them,
and come out through the other end. Indeed, in relation to group differences, I have
argued throughout that transcendence is not what we should aim for, because that is not
possible. Rather, my point is that the status quo's claim of overcoming group differences
is also undesirable for the same reason that the announcement of the end of nationalism
or class is undesirable: either will simply mean that one group's way of seeing the world
is universalized. The way to reduce the anxiety is not to refuse to acknowledge that
which is the source of the anxiety, but to live with it and to transform it from a nightmare into a noble dream.
149 IRIS YOUNG, supra note 1, at 169.

